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Abstract 
The World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 fundamentally 
transformed the context of reception for Muslim immigrants in the U.S., shifting it from 
neutral to negative while also brightening previously blurred boundaries between 
established residents and the Muslim minority.  This study explores how second-
generation Muslim immigrants have experienced and reacted to post-9/11 contexts of 
reception. It is based on an analysis of ten semi-structured in-depth interviews that 
were conducted throughout the Portland Metropolitan Area from January to April of 
2016. It finds experiences of discrimination to be primarily affected by two factors: 
public institutions and gender. It also finds, furthermore, that research participants 
react to negative post-9/11 contexts of reception by redrawing bright boundaries to 
include themselves within the American mainstream.  Because Islam itself has become 
politicized within post-9/11 contexts of reception, this study also explores how second-
generation Muslim immigrants construct and maintain religious meaning as a form of 
political identity.  It finds that research participants unilaterally construct a Localized 
Islam that is dynamic and variable in its response to familial and social pressures. The 
thesis concludes by putting forward a typology outlining its four primary forms of 
localization within contemporary social and political environments. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 served as the pivotal 
event whereby previously neutral contexts of reception once confronting Muslim 
immigrants in the U.S. have been fundamentally transformed. Since then, Muslims in 
the U.S. have been met by a decidedly negative context of reception, one where they 
are disproportionately visible and within which their suitability as Americans is 
questioned on the basis of their religious identity. They “are asked to explain who they 
are, what they believe in and what they stand for […] they have to manage their Islamic 
identity in host countries that often portray Muslims negatively and define Islam as a 
religion of violence” (Yildiz & Verkuyten, 2012:360).   
While such calls have been publicly directed toward Muslim immigrants in both 
Europe and North America (Alexander, 2013; Naber, 2006), different types of social 
boundaries have separated immigrants and natives on each side of the Atlantic divide.  
Alba (2005) has distinguished between ‘bright’ boundaries for Muslim immigrants in 
Europe, where “the distinction involved is unambiguous, so that individuals know at all 
times which side of the boundary they are on” (22) and ‘blurred’ boundaries for 
Mexican immigrants in the U.S, which involve “zones of self-presentation and social 
representation that allow for ambiguous locations with respect to the boundary.” This 
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research also emphasizes how previously blurred boundaries have also been made 
bright for Muslim immigrants within post-9/11 contexts of reception, further indicating 
the extent and nature of the environmental shift toward them. 
Post-9/11 Contexts of Reception
The argument for recognizing 9/11 as a pivotal event that shifted a previously 
neutral context of reception to negative is based upon two key observations. The first is 
that there is a significant difference in the context of reception for Muslims before and 
after 2001.  If the 9/11 attacks have in fact shifted the context of reception, its role as a 
‘pivotal event’ should be clearly delineative. Such a distinction should also make clear 
that there are meaningful differences between the two periods sufficient to classify 
them as comparatively ‘neutral’ and ‘negative’.   
The second is that Muslim immigrants are now disproportionately visible, due in 
large part to the renewed salience of Islamic religious identity in post-9/11 America. 
Historically, immigrant groups who have experienced disproportionate visibility have 
been seen as posing a special challenge to assimilation (Alba & Nee, 2003).  If post-9/11 
contexts of reception have in fact represented a shift from neutral to negative, the 
disproportionate visibility of Muslim immigrants in the U.S. should also be reflected in 
the problematization of Islamic religious identity in the public sphere. 
9/11 as a ‘Pivotal Event’ 
The World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 “were perhaps the 
single most important turning point in the American Muslim experience” according to 
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Yenigun (2004:40).  Despite the fact that the history of violent Islamic extremism in the 
U.S. began well before then, pre-9/11 contexts of reception appear to have been 
comparatively neutral for Muslim immigrants and their children (Portes & Rumbaut, 
2006). Vidino (2009), for example, outlines the history of homegrown terror networks 
inspired by radical Islamic extremism in substantial detail, estimating that “in the 1990’s 
between 1,000 and 2,000 volunteers left the United States to fight or train with various 
jihadist outfits throughout the world” (5).  Similarly, Yenigun (2004) observes that “after 
the Gulf War, and especially after the World Trade Center attack of 1993 and the 
embassy bombings in 1998, coverage of Muslims started to occupy a prominent place in 
the news” (40).  It was not until 9/11 that U.S. media began reflexively attributing the 
phenomenon of terrorism to Islamic fundamentalism, and “people who had Muslim 
origins” (63).   
Jihadist networks, “which were virtually ignored before 9/11” (Vidino, 2004:6) 
suddenly became a commonly understood security concern in mainstream public 
discourse. Individual Muslims became potential suspects as the ‘war on terror’ “took on 
local form on the streets, subjecting persons whose bodies, names, dress, or other 
markers signified an Arab, Middle Eastern, or Muslim identity to increased threats of 
harassment, violence, and intimidation” (Naber, 2006:235).  Before 9/11, terrorism was 
an overarching media frame that included radical Islamic extremism.  After 9/11, Islam 
itself began to constitute the overarching media frame for terrorism instead (Semati, 
2010; Kumar, 2010; Bail, 2012). The evident contrast between U.S. attitudes toward 
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Muslims and the relation between Islam and terrorism, before and after 9/11, suggests 
that the event did indeed act as a critical ‘turning point’ that can be seen to legitimately 
demarcate two distinct periods.  
Disproportionate Visibility 
One of the most prominent and centrally-defining features of post-9/11 contexts 
of reception is the disproportionate visibility of Islam and Muslim immigrants.  
Estimated at less than 1 percent of the overall population, the 2.3 million Muslims living 
in the U.S. “currently encounter far greater hostility than members of any other 
religious group” (Voas & Fleischmann, 2012:538). Following 9/11, “the Muslim 
population was no longer a silent minority.  It became visible by virtue of the attention 
lavished on it by the media, nationally and internationally, and this served to propel the 
population into the public sphere” (Lynch & Veale, 2008).  Here a minority has been 
made visible on the basis of their faith identity. In this context they have not only been 
subjected to Orientalist depictions of the ‘Muslim other’ (Mishra, 2008; Kumar, 2010), 
but also thrust into public debate as public figures – underscoring what Gole (2011) 
refers to as the “tumultuous transition of Muslims from the status of the invisible 
migrant-worker to that of visible Muslim citizenship” (383).   
In their discussion concerning how pivotal events may shift contexts of reception 
from positive to negative, Stepick & Dutton Stepick (2009) specifically highlight the 
potential of such shifts to shock immigrants and natives alike into an awareness of a 
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particular group’s “‘otherness’ vis-à-vis the national social and political landscape” (8).  
The disproportionate visibility of Muslim immigrants in the U.S. reflects this otherness, I 
have here argued, in the context of their religious identity and its implicit association 
with terrorism.  When combined with the pivotal shift in attitudes and perceptions 
toward Muslims brought on by 9/11, the disproportionate visibility of Muslim 
immigrants suggests the contemporary social and political environment to be an 
exemplar of a changed context of reception.   
Brightening a Once Blurred Boundary 
A secondary focus of this research concerns the effect of post-9/11 contexts of 
reception on the social boundary defining the distinction between immigrant and 
native.  Alba (2005) distinguishes between ‘bright’ boundaries, where “the distinction 
involved is unambiguous, so that individuals know at all times which side of the 
boundary they are on” (22) and ‘blurred’ boundaries, which involve “zones of self-
presentation and social representation that allow for ambiguous locations with respect 
to the boundary.”   A key effect of post-9/11 contexts of reception has been to make a 
previously blurred boundary bright for second-generation Muslim immigrants in the 
U.S., and is evidenced by three distinct developments: the securitization of Islam, the
political instrumentalization of Muslims, and the rise of Islamophobia. 
The Securitization of Islam & Political Instrumentalization of Muslims
6 
The emergence of a bright boundary can be seen in a number of ways.  Both 
Wike & Grim (2010) and Nisbet et. al. (2011) observe that public attitudes toward 
Muslims and Islam have been driven largely by threat perceptions since 9/11.  In a more 
specific analysis of this development, Jocelyn Cesari (2012) refers to the ‘securitization’ 
of European Muslims in this context: “Securitization refers to exceptional measures and 
procedures outside the rule of law, justified by emergency situations that threaten the 
survival of political community” (433).  This has been accomplished primarily by relying 
on Orientalist modes of thought and action that push controversial ideologies 
concerning Islam and the West “into the taken-for-granted ‘naturalized’ world of 
common sense” (Kumar, 2010:2). For example, the idea that Islam is inherently 
imperialistic and violent, and moreover that individual Muslims are simply proxies for 
both Islamic imperialism and values antithetical to contemporary Western norms, 
harnesses circumstantial truths about a small but significant minority and applies them, 
in toto, to Islam generally and Muslims everywhere. In this way, securitization makes 
public safety and security a categorically supraordinate concern in relation to Islam and 
Muslim immigrants.  In this way, furthermore, public fear and hostility have become 
aligned with security policy in such a way that a bright boundary is not only required but 
actively reinforced.   
Seizing on the idea of Islam as an existential threat in this ‘commonsense’ way, 
U.S. political actors have relied on exploiting fears of a Muslim threat for political gain, 
involving “the promotion of negative depictions and the assumption that they are, at 
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the least, threatening and implacable nemeses” (Sinno, 2012:219).  If the salience of 
public perceptions toward Muslims on one hand and security fears related to terrorism 
on the other has required the brightening of a once blurred boundary, the political 
instrumentalization of Muslims in the U.S. has actively relied upon its deployment as a 
salient distinction in the national public arena.  In both cases, the securitization and 
political instrumentalization of Muslim immigrants and Islam evidences the formation 
and intensification of a bright boundary for Muslims in the U.S. 
Islamophobia
Further evidence for the role of post-9/11 contexts of reception in establishing 
and reinforcing a bright boundary for Muslim immigrants lies in the documented rise of 
Islamophobia.  Bail’s (2015) analysis of Islamophobia’s dominant rise within the U.S. 
media between 2001 and 2008 emphasizes as a critical explanatory factor the role of 
both public fear and hostility toward Muslims in amplifying the voice of ‘anti-Muslim 
fringe groups’ within the public discourse. Taken together, the review of research 
literature offered so far is suggestive of a climate of fear – one which has not only driven 
a new hostility toward Muslim immigrants but also allowed dominant understandings of 
Islam as monolithic, misogynistic and inherently violent to become ‘commonsense’ 
(Kumar, 2010). 
For their part, scholars have taken two primary approaches toward 
Islamophobia.  The first focuses on Islamophobia as defined by “Indiscriminate negative 
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attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims” (Bleich, 2012: 182).  Because the 
term “has evolved from a primarily political concept toward one increasingly deployed 
for analytical purposes” (180), the focus remains on the “history, presence, dimensions, 
intensity, causes, and consequences of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments.” Other 
authors have extended such analyses to include the ‘racialization’ of Muslims (Sayyid & 
Vakil, 2010; Naber, 2006) in the broader historical and colonial context of Western 
nations.   
The second approach has focused on fear rather than hostility toward Muslims 
and Islam as the basis for approaching and understanding Islamophobia.  Marranci 
(2004), for example, argues that Islamophobia “has its last raison d’etre in the fear of 
multiculturalism and its consequences” (105).  It is the ‘transruptive’ potential of Islam 
and Muslim immigrants within a truly multicultural society that, in this view, ultimately 
grounds fear-driven public discourses in the post-9/11 West.  “It is not the immigrant 
that anguishes [author of the controversial text Clash of Civilizations, Samuel] 
Huntington, but multiculturalism and the connected risk of transculturation processes” 
(114).   
In both cases, the rise of Islamophobia can be seen as a result of the emergence 
of negative post-9/11 contexts of reception and the formation of bright boundaries for 
Muslims in the U.S.  And it is these bright boundaries, driven by the fear and hostility 
that define post-9/11 contexts of reception, that ‘anti-Muslim fringe groups’ have 
exploited in order to disproportionately amplify their voice in the media and make a 
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sincerely broad-based appeal to the quintessential nativism that drives the basic 
protective impulses of a polity.  In this way, bright boundaries for Muslims in the fields 
of politics and the media interact with and mutually-reinforce post-9/11 contexts of 
reception. The location of Muslim immigrants no longer appears to be ambiguous with 
respect to the boundary. 
The Critical Intersection of Second Generation Muslim Immigrants in the U.S.
Abbas (2012) has discussed the relationship between Islamophobia and 
Radicalization as ‘symbiotic’ in his research on the effects of counter-radicalization 
policies among Muslim youth in Britain, concluding that the debate over British 
multiculturalism “in effect securitises a focus on integration, which then problematises 
the ‘Muslimness’ of Muslims in relation to questions of political violence and 
extremism” (Abbas, 2012:346).  While emphasizing Alba’s (2005) identification of bright 
boundaries for Muslim immigrants in Europe, Abbas’s (2012) research also highlights an 
important intersection for Muslim immigrants in both Europe and the U.S.  The rise of 
Islamophobia and the radicalization of second-generation Muslim immigrants have been 
documented in research on both continents (Post & Sheffer, 2006; Bail, 2012), yet 
comparatively little work, especially in the U.S., has examined Muslim immigrants at the 
crossroads of this critical intersection.  
Furthermore, while most first-generation Muslim immigrants are able to reflect 
on their experiences in the U.S. pre and post-9/11, a progressively smaller share of the 
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second generation understands both sides of this historical demarcation through lived 
experience.  For many second-generation Muslim immigrants, 9/11 has shaped the only 
social and political environment they have ever known.  Where members of the first 
generation have often arrived with well-defined cultural and religious identities formed 
in their country of origin (Roy, 2004), the second generation has been raised and 
socialized within social and political environments defined largely by Islamophobia 
(Portes & Rumbaut, 2006).  For these reasons, young adult second-generation Muslim 
immigrants are the primary focus of this study.   
Motivations for Research 
As a comparatively understudied population in the U.S. this group also exists at a 
critical intersection between Islamophobia at home and the recruitment efforts of 
radical extremists abroad.  They are comparatively understudied relative to the first 
generation of Muslim immigrants more generally. And more particularly, they are 
understudied relative to other immigrant groups in the U.S, especially in relation to their 
European counterparts, and have come to constitute a vulnerable population in this 
regard.   
Abbas’ (2012) discussion of the symbiotic relationship between Islamophobia 
and radicalization, and their potential to mutually-reinforce and exacerbate one 
another, is a point of vulnerability for the larger society as well, I would argue, because 
as a nation of immigrants the health and vitality of the United States has been 
fundamentally linked to the eventual assimilation of immigrant groups (Alba & Nee, 
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2003).  The burdensome effects of social and economic discrimination, by contrast, have 
never boded well for immigrants or the larger society. 
Research Questions 
Are second generation Muslim immigrants continuing to assimilate as research 
indicates their forebears have done before them (Gest, 2012)? Or are the effects of 
disproportionate visibility and Islamophobia giving rise to reactive ethnicity (Portes & 
Rumbaut, 2006)?  These are deeply consequential questions that require scholarly 
exploration, and which affect both Muslim immigrants themselves as well as the host 
nation to which they belong.  This research asks therefore: How have the children of
Muslim immigrants in the U.S. experienced and reacted to post-9/11 social and political 
environments?  
The renewed salience of Islamic religious identity in post-9/11 America has put 
Islam squarely at issue in political terms for second-generation Muslim immigrants. This 
research also asks, in addition: How do second-generation Muslim immigrants in the U.S.
construct and maintain religious meaning?  In the midst of Islamophobia and ‘culture 
talk’ concerning the compatibility of Islamic and Western values, what Islam actually ‘is’ 
among this population has become a legitimate, and so far understudied empirical 
question.   
Research Goals 
What follows is an exploratory study on young adult, second-generation Muslim 
immigrants in the U.S.  Beyond an answer to the research questions, it has two 
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additional secondary goals:  to give voice to an underrepresented group and to identify 
hypothesis and fertile grounds for future research.  This is done primarily through in-
depth interviews designed to explore possible bases for analyzing both the effects of 
post-9/11 environments and the political claims of contemporary post-9/11 discourses 
in relation to what Islam is and, by extension, who exactly Muslim immigrants in the U.S. 
are.  More particularly, this thesis aims to explore what Islam is for young adult second 
generation Muslims and how these immigrants view themselves and assimilation into 
U.S. society. Being exploratory in nature, this study seeks to answer the two research 
questions with the recognition that the answers will be tentative, given the modest 
empirical sample and methodological limitations (discussed below). 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
This section develops my theoretical framework for addressing how 9/11 affects 
the assimilation of second-generation Muslim immigrants.  I begin with an outline of the 
context of reception, the concept most directly relevant to the events of 9/11, and 
indicate how it can vary both over time and place.  Next, I highlight the role of boundary 
processes within Alba & Nee’s (2003) contemporary formulation of new assimilation 
theory and explain their relevance to the context of reception.  Finally, while the role of 
religion was largely absent from assimilation theory, for post-9/11 Muslims’ assimilation 
religion is inescapable.  Using Portes & Rumbaut (2006), I conclude the theoretical 
framework with a discussion of religion in the context of contemporary Muslim 
immigration.   
The Context of Reception 
Stepick & Dutton Stepick (2009) have offered a useful and comprehensive 
account of the context of reception, i.e. the environment that confronts immigrants 
upon arrival to the host nation, which includes the ongoing attitudes, available 
opportunities and policies of the host society within which the second and third 
generation of immigrants grow up and reside. The authors depict positive, neutral and 
negative contexts of reception, how they vary between national, regional and local 
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levels, as well as how they shift and change over time. Stepick & Dutton Stepick (2009) 
describe the construct as dynamic and variable across multiple levels throughout the 
society. It is thus a compelling framework within which to analyze second-generation 
Muslim immigrants because it allows for an exploration of the construct without 
becoming fixed upon or preoccupied with one particular form or historical period, 
exhibiting what Derrida (1964) once referred to as ‘play’.     
The United States has repeatedly undergone an internal debate over the relative 
costs and benefits of immigration at different points throughout its history (Alba & Nee, 
2003).  Today “there is once again a factionalizing discourse as some established 
residents feel the new cultural norms brought by migrants threaten their perception of 
the American way of life, while others welcome the diversity and accept a new cultural 
pluralism” (Stepick & Dutton Stepick, 2009:2). These tensions have come to theoretically 
define the context of reception, determining “the opportunities available to immigrants 
and how immigrants are treated by members of the host society” (Ibid). 
Positive, Negative and Neutral Contexts at National, Regional and Local Levels 
Where immigrants encounter favorable terms such as legal status, economic 
opportunities, and welcoming treatment by established residents they are said to 
encounter a positive context of reception.  The U.S. policy toward Cuban immigrants, for 
example, is identified by Stepick & Dutton Stepick (2009) as ‘extremely favorable’ in 
relation to their later-arriving Nicaraguan and Haitian counterparts.  Cuban immigrants 
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are granted permanent residency in the U.S. after only one year. In the 1960’s and 
1970’s, Cubans also received “a vast array of benefits that allowed [them] to quickly re-
certify their professional credentials and establish businesses” (Stepick & Dutton 
Stepick, 2009:3).   
Haitians, by contrast, have encountered “at all levels consistently negative 
contexts of reception” (6). According to Stepick & Dutton Stepick (2009), U.S. coast 
guard ships have regularly interdicted boats headed toward the U.S. from Haiti, refused 
to grant asylum or refugee status, and jailed “without parole Haitians who do make it to 
the U.S. without a visa and claim they want to stay” (Ibid).  Mexican immigration to the 
U.S., meanwhile, is highlighted as an example of neither positive nor negative contexts
of reception. Instead, they experience a mixture of tolerance, discrimination and neglect 
at various levels.  Contexts of reception are therefore seen as positive, negative, or 
ambivalent in this way, and are often highlighted as one of, if not the most important, 
determinants of life outcomes and trajectories of community well-being.   
In addition to being identified as positive, negative or ambivalent, contexts of 
reception can also vary across national, regional and local levels.  While legal and 
political debate largely occurs at the national level (seen for example in recent proposals 
at the national level to build a wall on the Southern border with Mexico, grant a general 
amnesty, deport undocumented aliens, or impose a moratorium on all immigration from 
Muslim-majority nations), there is also a cultural debate and associated activities over 
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integration and assimilation that reaches into and impacts contexts of reception at the 
regional and local levels, involving both local media as well as “private discourses in the 
minds of individuals” (Ibid).  The ‘suitability’ of Muslims as citizens and the 
‘compatibility’ of Islam with Western norms are two prominent examples of such 
private discourses that exist not only in the national debate, but also can emerge in local 
interactions at such banal locations as grocery stores and schools.   
At the local level, furthermore, prior research on New York and Los Angeles has 
highlighted the comparatively favorable effect particular geographies can create for 
second generation immigrants (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf & Waters, 2004; Kasinitz et. al., 
2008).  Immigrants and their children currently make up more than half of the 
population of New York city, compared to less than a quarter for native-born whites and 
their children.  What this has essentially meant in New York City, according to Kasinitz, 
Mollenkopf & Watern (2004), is that a long history of immigration to has reshaped the 
local context of reception such that the traditional ‘bright line’ between white natives 
and non-white immigrants exists in a more ‘blurred’ form and experienced more like a 
continuum.  In this way, local contexts can both reflect and diverge from regional and 
national contexts of reception. 
Where policy and legal status are at stake in largely national terms, economic 
opportunity and social inclusion are more immediately at stake at the regional and local 
levels, respectively.  Mexican immigrants are currently an emblematic example of this 
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variation between levels in the U.S. (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006).  For example, the 
undocumented status of many Mexican immigrants is problematized in political terms at 
the national level while low-wage labor and service-sector employment opportunities 
remain available at local and regional levels.  Thus positive, negative and ambivalent 
contexts of reception can align or diverge at national, regional and local levels, resulting 
in various forms of consonance and dissonance for various immigrant groups in the U.S. 
across different places and at different times – with important consequences in each 
case. 
While most literature focuses on first generation immigrants, increasingly 
scholars have specifically focused on the second generation (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, 
2006; Alba & Nee, 2003; Roy, 2004; Nagel & Staeheli, 2011; Sirseloudi, 2012; Voas & 
Fleischmann, 2012; Abbas, 2012), for whom contexts of reception also constitute the 
environments into which they are socialized, and within which they construct and 
maintain religious meaning. When presented with a positive context of reception, 
“immigrants are more likely to feel a sense of belonging that incorporates the 
immigrants into the established residents’ figurations” (Stepick & Dutton Stepick, 
2009:10). On the other hand, when presented with a negative context of reception, 
“marked by prejudice and discrimination, immigrants are more likely to react by 
constructing alternative configurations apart from those of the established residents” 
(Ibid). In the absence of a negative context of reception, members of the second 
generation can be seen to “proprietarily take their place in society for granted” (Ibid). It 
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is the shock of pivotal events, however, that can force them “to reflect on their sense of 
belonging.” 
Slow Changes or Sudden Shifts? 
Contexts of reception can also shift and change (Stepick & Dutton Stepick, 2009).  
The passage of time across immigrant generations, the intensity of personal interactions 
within a given context of reception, or the occurrence of ‘pivotal events’ can all serve to 
shift contexts of reception from positive to negative, or in any other possible direction.  
To demonstrate this phenomenon, the authors highlight the 2001 case of Elian Gonzales 
as a pivotal event for Cubans in Miami, who strongly believed he should stay in the U.S., 
even though “non-Hispanics both inside and outside of Miami [believed] that the boy 
should be reunited with his father in Cuba” (Stepick & Dutton Stepick, 2009:7).  In this 
way the national and local contexts of reception diverged for Miami Cuban Youth, 
shocking them “into an awareness of their ‘otherness’ vis-à-vis the national social and 
political landscape” (8), and forcing them to reflect on their sense of belonging within 
the American mainstream.  In the next chapter, I shall argue that 9/11 constituted a 
dramatic change of context of reception for Muslim immigrants to the U.S. 
Boundaries & Boundary Processes 
In their extension of classical assimilation theory, Alba & Nee (2003) have 
identified both formal (state) and informal (cultural) mechanisms to account for 
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contemporary assimilation trends.  State institutions have formally increased the cost of 
discrimination in the workplace and in public institutions, they argue; first by protecting 
the civil rights of immigrants, and second, by punishing acts of overt discrimination. 
Cultural mechanisms of assimilation have reduced informal racism in personal 
relationships and residential segregation by promoting inclusion as a value. This 
‘valorization of inclusion’ has proven “sufficient to produce public and private policies 
intended to foster it within the framework of equality under the law” (280).  This 
cultural change, Alba & Nee (2005) argue, “is contributing to an incremental remolding 
of that mainstream” (Ibid).  “Assimilation has reshaped the American mainstream in the 
past, and it will do so again, culturally, institutionally, and demographically” (282).   
The process of incorporation into the mainstream basically involves “reducing 
perceptions of the individuals’ cultural and social distance from the dominant group” 
(Alba & Nee, 2003:286). As Alba (2005) has observed in subsequent research, 
furthermore, the boundaries immigrants cross and the processes they employ within 
them do not always look the same across time and place.  Between Europe and the U.S., 
for example, Alba (2005) has distinguished between ‘bright’ boundaries, where “the 
distinction involved is unambiguous, so that individuals know at all times which side of 
the boundary they are on” (22) and ‘blurred’ boundaries, which involve “zones of self-
presentation and social representation that allow for ambiguous locations with respect 
to the boundary.”  While “blurred boundaries generally characterize the situation of 
Mexicans in the U.S., […] bright boundaries characterize the European context for 
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Muslim groups” (20).  The nature of the boundary is particularly relevant because 
immigrant groups “have produced an adult second generation, socialized in the 
receiving society and having the potential to challenge or cross boundaries that are 
more or less taken for granted in the case of its immigrant parents” (21).   
For the second generation, different boundary processes associated with each 
boundary type determine the form assimilation will take.  In the case of a bright 
boundary, “assimilation is likely to take the form of boundary crossing and will generally 
be experienced by the individual as something akin to a conversion” (Alba, 2005:24).  
Where membership in one groups begins, in another it ends. Blurred boundaries, by 
contrast, “could mean that individuals are seen as simultaneously members of the 
groups on both sides of the boundary or that sometimes they appear to be members of 
one and at other times members of the other” (25).  In the case of a blurred boundary, 
assimilation is likely to occur through selective acculturation, where immigrants employ 
strategies to manage both familial and public social zones of identity and belonging.   
While positive and neutral contexts of reception generally allow for boundary-
blurring to occur, negative contexts of reception rely on bright boundaries to clearly 
mark natives and immigrants apart from one another. While comparatively neutral pre-
9/11 contexts of reception suggest a blurred boundary once existed for Muslims in the 
U.S., evidenced by research on Iranian immigrants in the 1990’s (Bozorgmehr, 1997;
Allen & Turner, 1996; Moghissi, 1999; Modarres, 1998; Jasso, 1997) for example, the 
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shift to comparatively negative post-9/11 contexts of reception in the U.S. has also 
meant a concurrent shift in the nature of the perceived boundary between Muslim 
immigrants and non-Muslim natives from blurred to bright. What this has meant for 
boundary processes among the second generation, in particular, remains one of the 
core exploratory foci of this research.  
The Role of Political Identity 
To address this second development, this study emphasizes the utility of political 
identity within boundary processes for members of the second generation. In particular, 
the renewed salience of religious identity for Muslim immigrants in the U.S. suggests 
that religious identity serves as an important form of political identity in response to 
negative post-9/11 contexts of reception (Mamdani, 2002).  Political identity here refers 
to the understanding and expression of the self in relation to one’s perspective and 
perceived individual/group self-interest.  The construction and maintenance of religious 
meaning among members of the second generation thus serves as the primary lens of 
analysis for political identity in this context.  
Mamdani (2002) observes that 9/11 “has turned religious experience into a 
political category” (765). By politicizing Islam in relation to the West, Mamdani (2002) 
argues that we have come to view the ‘clash of civilizations’ between ‘Islam and the 
West’ as a fundamentally cultural conflict. The problem with ‘culture talk’ – the idea 
that political differences are fundamentally rooted in cultural and religious beliefs, 
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according to Mamdani (2002), is that it dehistoricizes political identities in order to 
essentialize them.  In other words: terrorism that claims Islamic motivation is 
interpreted by those in the West as a reflection of Islamic culture and politics.  It follows, 
then, among those who accept this logic in taking such a view (e.g. Huntington but also 
many others) that Islam is culturally opposed and antithetical to Western culture and 
thus, the two are intrinsically opposed and necessarily conflictual.   
While this explains the rhetoric of both radical Islam and Islamophobia, the logic 
is fundamentally flawed in its assumption of two independent, opposed civilizations.  
Mamdani (2002) argues compellingly on this point that, historically speaking, Islam and 
the West “are born of an encounter, and neither can be understood in isolation, outside 
of the history of that encounter” (767).  If Western political power is representative of 
Western culture, the logic of culture talk goes, then its politics must be a reflection of its 
true nature, it’s ‘real self’. Thus, it can be judged accordingly. But of course, anyone 
familiar with the complex fractures and contradictory impulses at the heart of any 
politics, much less Western politics, can also understand the gross simplicity of this kind 
of essentialism.  In order to avoid the myriad reductions of culture talk, we must 
“question the very tendency to read Islamist politics as an effect of Islamic civilization – 
whether good or bad – and Western power as an effect of Western civilization” 
(Mamdani, 2002:767).  Reducing complex realities into simplistic frames of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ achieves only two things: first, it uproots them from historical reality – to which 
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contemporary reality is often tethered; and second, it fuels contemporary distortions 
that continually misidentify problems and their solutions.   
Thus, culture talk is only possible if we forget history.  And Mamdani’s (2002) 
observation that culture talk dehistoricizes political identities recognizes this ‘historical 
forgetfulness’ on both sides of the conflict between ‘Islam and the West’. Despite the 
fallacies and historical anachronisms of ‘culture talk’, however, political identities 
remain the primary vehicle for speech and action within post-9/11 contexts of 
reception. And in this sense Islamic terrorism, according to Mamdani (2002), is a 
‘modern construction’ at the service of a ‘modern political project’. “The distinction 
between political terror and crime is that the former makes an open claim for support” 
(773). Terrorists “have a cause and a need to be heard […]” (Ibid). Thus, “the only way to 
isolate individual terrorists is to do so politically, by addressing the issues in which 
terrorists ‘wrap themselves up’.” Political and religious identity have, therefore, are 
importantly wrapped up in each other.  
Viewing immigrants’ religion through the lens of political identity is not a recent 
innovation, either.  Alba & Nee (2003) discuss the historical salience of religious identity 
in relation to European Jews and Catholics during 20th century U.S. immigration, for 
example, but do not specifically address Muslims.  Similarly, while Alba’s (2005) 
comparative study of second-generation immigrants examines Muslims in Europe and 
Mexicans in the U.S., it does not examine the comparative aspects of religion and 
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ethnicity as principles of group organization in relation to political identity.  And while 
Portes & Rumbaut (2006) provide an incisive account alluding to the effects of 9/11 as a 
pivotal event, and set this accounting against a broader discussion of Islam within U.S. 
immigration history, they do not specifically focus on the second generation of 
immigrants in this regard, nor do they focus on the assimilative tendencies of upwardly 
mobile Muslim immigrant groups in the U.S. and the attendant relevance of boundary 
processes toward this end. Thus, while immigration scholars have consistently observed 
the historical intersection between immigrants’ religious and political identities, they 
have also consistently pointed to the renewed contemporary salience of this 
intersection for Muslim immigrants in the post-9/11 era.  This research simply makes 
the connection between religious and political identity explicit in this context, and 
proceeds according to the vision of potential problematics already identified throughout 
the broader immigration research literature.   
The Role of Religion: Linear vs. Reactive Identity 
Portes & Rumbaut (2006) offer the final component of the theoretical 
framework offered here in their analysis of the “role of religion in the development of 
ethnic communities and the reassertion of national cultures and language” (p.311). Of 
the ‘three Rs’ that define the function of religion for immigrants the first two, ‘respect’ 
and ‘resources’, are key factors in strengthening ethnic communities and facilitating 
upward mobility where “channels of communication between the two generations 
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remain open, strengthening beliefs and norms antithetical to downward assimilation” 
(p.323).  When religion acts as a source of ‘refuge’, the third function Portes & Rumbaut 
(2006) identify, it can help mitigate the effects of social and economic barriers erected 
by the host society against immigrants and their communities, but it can also represent 
a space where “religion becomes reactive, signaling a break from the past” (p.332).  
Reactive religiosity, the authors note, “compromises selective acculturation 
when it is pitted against the beliefs and norms of parents, although it may offer to some 
the chance to find the meaning and direction that, for some reason, they do not find at 
home” (p.336).  Here religion is constructed to meet individual needs on an individual’s 
terms, often in response to traumatic encounters with social and economic 
discrimination. Where religion does not become reactive, it remains linear, according to 
Portes & Rumbaut (2006). Here parents and children continue to adhere to the religion 
of their forebears, “reaffirming traditional beliefs as a source of comfort and protection” 
(326). 
Previous studies of immigrant religion lead us to expect that for second 
generation Muslim immigrants it might provide respect and resources. But the 
fundamental transformation of the context of reception for Muslim immigrants, 
detailed above, might lead us to expect that Muslim immigrants could find refuge and 
adopt a reactive religiosity. Moreover, the politicization of Islam, especially prevalent 
since 9/11, adds a dimension to religion not envisioned by Portes and Rumbaut (2006). 
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Understanding the construction and maintenance of Islamic religious meaning therefore 
requires that we look beyond the immigration literature to contemporary scholarship on 
Islam itself. 
Globalization & Pluralized Religious Authority in Islam 
The politics of Islamic terrorism continue to be expressed by terrorist groups, 
and their agents, in expressly religious terms. Their claims for support, meanwhile, are 
consistently defined by claims to Islamic normativity in the global public sphere.  This is 
problematic for a number of reasons – to a lesser extent because it confounds the 
separation between the political and religious that defines many contemporary 
analyses, but most of all because religious authority has always been pluralized in the 
Muslim world – i.e. it has always existed in a political context of its own making.    
It is important to consider that “there has never existed a situated, singular 
source of authentic Muslim knowledge… globalization can be seen to represent a 
further shift in the extent and intensity of debate about the meaning and nature of the 
authoritative in Islam” (Mandaville, 2007:102).  Unlike the Catholic Church where the 
Pope is an ultimate authority, Islam is more like Protestantism in that there is no single 
authority to determine religious disputes.  Instead, there are different schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, known as fiq, which guide a pluralized religious authority that is diffuse 
and local in its manifestations (Mandaville, 2007).  Hence, religious authority does exist, 
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but there is no clearly and universally-sanctioned centralized authority figure.  Thus, 
pluralized religious authority in the Muslim world has always been politically ‘at play’. 
In a system where religious authority has always been pluralized in this way, and 
now on a truly global scale, discussions about what Islam is and is not are not so clear 
cut.  As Mandaville (2007) observes: “claims and pronouncements as to what Islam is 
and is not tend to function simultaneously as statements of geopolitical and geocultural 
affiliation […] An appreciation of how geopolitics mediates the intense politicization of 
almost any public claim to Islamic normativity is hence central to understanding the 
complex plurality of authority in the Muslim world today” (112-113).   
Simply put, because religious authority has always been pluralized in the Muslim 
world, and because pronouncements as to what ‘is’ or ‘is not’ Islamic are simultaneously 
statements of geopolitical and geocultural affiliation, I argue that simple claims to 
Islamic normativity in the global public sphere are themselves sufficient to categorize a 
given event or phenomena as ‘Islamic’ because of the resultant inability of any other 
person to credibly or authoritatively say otherwise in the scholarly sense.  In other 
words, because Islamic terrorism has been consistently defined by claims to Islamic 
normativity in the global public sphere, the political issues and claims for support in 
which terrorists ‘wrap themselves up’ must also be understood in religious terms. In this 
way, contemporary constructions of Islam can also be seen as constructions of political 
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identity, distinguished primarily by the form and nature of historical consciousness they 
employ.  
There appear to be two main variants of Islam that can be identified in this 
regard: ‘Globalized Islam’ (Roy, 2004) and what I have termed ‘Localized Islam’.  
Mamdani (2002) observes that “Islam is today the banner for diverse and contradictory 
political projects.  It is not only anti-imperialist Islamist movements but also imperialist 
projects, not only demands to extend participation in public life but also dictatorial 
agendas, which carry the banner of Islam. The minimum prerequisite for political action 
today must be the ability to tell one from the other” (774).  In order to do just that, to 
‘tell one from the other’ for the purposes of this research, this distinction between 
Globalized Islam and Localized Islam will serve as the basis for the analysis of political 
identities among Second-generation Muslim immigrants in this study.   
Localized Islam 
Localized Islam appears to manifest according to two distinct but related forms 
of historical consciousness.  The first involves the ongoing and creative construction of 
Islam within contemporary geographical and cultural contexts.  This can be both 
apolitical, where diverse communities emphasize the aspects of Islam that are 
particularly meaningful to them for one reason or another, or political, where Islam is 
constructed in response to locally-dominant media portrayals, contemporary discourses 
and social interactions that have themselves politicized Islam in one way or another. In 
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either case, the construction and maintenance of religious meaning is said to be 
‘localized’ because its roots lie in a particular geography or culture of the past or 
present. 
Research on the role of mosques in the acculturation process for Muslim 
immigrant women, for example, emphasizes the unique functions of ‘conservative’ and 
‘liberal’ mosques in meeting the needs of different immigrant generations (Ozyurt, 
2010).  ‘Conservative’ Mosques are seen to embody ‘separatist cultures’ “whose 
primary goal is to preserve the identity and culture of ‘back home’” for first-generation 
Muslim immigrants (302).  Liberal, or ‘futuristic’, Mosques with ‘integrationist cultures’ 
are seen to facilitate “the integration of the Muslim community in the United States and 
the creation of a new American-Muslim identity” (305) for second and third-generation 
Muslim immigrants. In this case it becomes relatively clear that Muslim immigrant 
communities with different generational compositions actively seek, create and rely on 
different institutions – and distinctly different visions of Islam - to fulfill fundamentally 
different needs.   
In a more political manner, Muslims living within post-9/11 contexts of reception 
“are asked to explain who they are, what they believe in and what they stand for… they 
have to manage their Islamic identity in host countries that often portray Muslims 
negatively and define Islam as a religion of violence” (Yildiz & Verkuyten, 2012:360).  In 
this context, Muslim organizations in the Netherlands and Germany “publicly define a 
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morally acceptable identity by arguing ‘what we are not’” (359).  Islam, and by extension 
Muslim immigrants, present themselves as compatible with both democracy and the 
host nation. The Fetullah Gulen movement established in the 1960’s, for example, 
“focuses on the universal ethic of love, serving others and peaceful co-existence… 
[r]ather than the five pillars of Islam” (364), and has been offered as a response to
public challenges to Muslim identity and negative stereotypes equating Islam with 
violence.  Yukleyen & Yurdakul (2011) argue importantly that “the variety of attitudes 
and approaches to integration by Islamic organisations indicate that Islam itself as a set 
of abstract principles is neither an obstacle nor an encouragement to the integration of 
Muslim immigrants. The organizations themselves set the tone…” (80) 
The second form of localization involves Islam’s construction and articulation 
within the history of specific geographies and cultures of the past, usually associated 
with a particular ethnicity.  “Of course, by definition Islam is universal, but after the time 
of the Prophet and his companions (the Salaf) it has always been embedded in given 
cultures” (Roy, 2004:25).  The cultures within which Islam has been historically 
embedded span across Indonesia and the Indian subcontinent to the Middle East and 
North Africa.  “Islam looks very different in each of these regions because as the religion 
spread it adopted the customs and traditions of the people of various lands” (Kumar, 
2010:8).  Sufism, Shiism, Sunni Islam are as distinct from one another as are the myriad 
cultures and ethnicities that construct and shape the practice of Islam within them.  The 
idea of a universally-essentialized and monolithic Islam becomes increasingly difficult to 
31 
account for, “given the diversity of Islamic practices that run the gamut from secular 
democracies (such as Indonesia) to dictatorships (such as Saudi Arabia)” (Ibid).  The vast 
majority of Muslims throughout the Islamic world and its diaspora, where they are 
integrating within their host nations, appear to construct and understand Islam in a 
localized manner (Gest, 2012; Wike & Grim, 2010).   
Globalized Islam 
The phenomenon of globalization, according to Roy (2004), has provided a “good 
opportunity to dissociate Islam from any given culture and to provide a model that 
could work beyond any culture” (25).  ‘Deculturation’ refers to the process that involves 
such a decoupling of religion and culture, leaving a globalized Islam purged of local and 
cultural content.  Roy (2004) specifically refers to Islamic fundamentalism as a ‘tool of 
deculturation’.  Sadowski (2006) agrees: “fundamentalist groups share a mission that 
can be both revolutionary and reactionary: They seek to purge Islam of local or non-
Muslim practices that may have crept in over the centuries and to return it to the pure 
practice of the faith that prevailed during the life of the Prophet” (220). The form of 
historical consciousness that emerges here is preoccupied with an idealization of one 
particular historical period, not a particular locality or culture in the past or present.  
What makes fundamentalist Islam eventually constitute a ‘globalized Islam’, 
then, is the Islamist conviction that “lay Muslims, people with experience in the world 
and not just holy texts, also have a voice in the interpretation of the faith and the 
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construction of its political institutions” (Sadowski, 2006:221).  The preoccupation with a 
particular view of one historical period, while implicitly global, ironically requires 
globalized flows of information and informal interpersonal linkages rooted in the 
contemporary period to become globally coherent and collectively free their voices to 
make authoritative claims to Islamic normativity in the global public sphere.  Globalized 
Islam is, in this manner, a thoroughly modern construction as Mamdani (2002) insists.   
It has not been until the advent of the internet, in the form of a truly globalized 
communications infrastructure, that pluralized religious authority across the Islamic 
world and its diaspora achieved such a level of coherence and coordination. And as 
Cesari (2009) observes: “any comprehensive understanding of Muslim minorities needs 
to take the phenomenon of global Islam into account” where “technological 
developments are affecting Islamic discourse and breaking up the monopoly of 
traditional religious authorities on spiritual issues” (162).  Amidst myriad forms of 
Localized Islam within individual communities and throughout the world also exists a 
globalized vision that purports to speak for all Muslims – for Islam itself, preoccupied 
with a return to the historical reality of 7th century Arabia.   
“Within this broad [globalized] market of ideas and interpretations, there is now 
a global source for Islamic thought, resulting in an exponential increase of Islamic 
authority figures… Virtual Islam is part of this second form of transnational Islam. 
‘Electronic religiosity is causing Islam to expand globally via the circulation of 
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audio and videotapes, the broadcast of independent television satellite shows, 
and, most significantly, the creation of websites. Bulletin boards, chatrooms, and 
discussion forums on the internet are promoting alternative and even 
contradictory understandings of Islam where monolithic, national interpretations 
previously existed” (Cesari, 2009:167) 
In her discussion of ‘virtual Islam’, Cesari (2009) also makes an important 
distinction between fundamentalism and radicalism.  The construction of a Globalized 
Islam does not necessarily lead to radicalization – that is another step on its own.  But 
their views fit with one another on several key grounds. “They make absolute claims to 
the truth, they demand blind obedience, they idealize one particular period of history, 
they claim that their ends justify any means, and they deploy a formal concept of holy 
war (Kimball, 2011; Stern, 2003). But these doctrines do not cause people to be 
terrorists; rather, potential terrorists seem to select or construct these types of 
doctrines” (Sadowski, 2006:232).  In other words, not all who construct and practice a 
Globalized Islam are terrorists, but the vast majority of terrorists appear to practice and 
construct a Globalized Islam and eschew its localized manifestations.   
In summary, this theoretical framework has outlined the way in which diverse 
contexts of reception connect with and inform different types of immigrant-native 
boundaries and their associated boundary processes.  The role of politically-salient 
religious identities has also been highlighted as the primary vehicle Muslim immigrants 
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use to navigate through these processes within post-9/11 contexts of reception.  Finally, 
it has described the construction of linear and reactive religious identities and their 
consequences, illustrating how they have been linked in the research literature to 
different contexts of reception and boundary processes.  In the model below, positive 
and ambivalent contexts of reception are shown to be associated predominantly with 
blurred boundaries, selective acculturation processes and linear religious identities. The 
relationship between negative contexts of reception, bright boundaries and reactive 
identity formation is much more straightforward and entails much less variability. 
Integrated Analytical Model 
1) Context of Reception:
2) Boundary & Process:
3) Religious Identity:
Figure 1. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
The Effects of Post-9/11 Contexts of Reception in the U.S. and Europe 
There are significant differences between Muslim immigration to the U.S. and 
Europe that are, in turn, reflected in their respective research literatures on the second 
generation.  Historically, large-scale Muslim immigration to Europe was established via 
temporary post-WWII guest-worker programs which eventually became permanent, 
paving the way for a flow of Muslim immigration that gradually “crowd[ed] into small 
homogenous nations” (Leiken, 2005:122). In the U.S., Muslims immigrated in a 
comparatively gradual manner – one that was also geographically diffuse and ethnically-
fragmented within a nation itself built on immigration (Ibid).  For this reason, the 
European research literature has focused more straightforwardly on the religion of 
Muslim immigrants, while research in the U.S. has primarily focused on their ethnicities 
or countries of origin –reflecting Alba’s (2005) critical finding concerning the role of 
respectively bright and blurred boundaries in each context.   
Research on the Second Generation in Europe 
This review separates the European research literature on second generation 
Muslim immigrants into three basic categories: 1) economic achievement & educational 
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attainment as markers of structural integration, 2) cultural integration and social 
barriers and 3) religiosity.  Each category can be seen to reflect the distinctly European 
research context, moreover.    Studies focusing on economic achievement and 
educational attainment of the second generation, for example, are often conducted 
within cross-national frameworks comparing the UK, France, Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands and their respective Bangladeshi, Maghrebian, Turkish and Moroccan 
Muslim populations.  Crul & Vermeulen (2003) were among the first to observe that 
“the oldest children born to postwar immigrants on European soil have recently entered 
the job market” (965) and can now be studied as a group according to their educational 
and economic performance, which they undertake through comparative analyses of 
differences immigrant groups and national contexts.  Others, such as Algan et. al. 
(2009), have conducted comparative education and employment analyses of Muslim 
immigrant groups across both national contexts and first/second generations.  Beyond 
cross-national analyses, other scholars have compared the economic and educational 
performance of different Muslim immigrant groups within the same country 
(Timmerman, Vanderwaeren & Crul, 2003; Silberman, Alba & Fournier, 2007).   
These studies have consistently found lower educational and economic 
outcomes among Muslim immigrants, and the second generation in particular, to be the 
case: “a Muslim candidate is 2.5 times less likely to receive a job interview callback than 
his or her Christian counterpart… [while] second-generation Muslim households in 
France have lower income compared with matched Christian households” (Adida, Laitin 
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& Valfort, 2007:22384).  These differences have been attributed by scholars to barriers 
rooted in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim discrimination. While Silberman, Alba & 
Fournier (2007) also find that “Muslims are substantially, if not severely, disadvantaged” 
they also add that: “they believe they have suffered from discrimination in the hiring 
process and their reports have strong plausibility” (1).    In the midst of this 
discrimination forcing the second generation into lower segments of the labor market 
Timmerman, Vanderwaeren & Crul (2003) also observe that “Islamism can provide a 
transparent, supportive, and all-embracing frame of reference” (1065) in response.   
Secondly, European research on cultural integration pointedly reflects Alba’s 
(2005) findings concerning the role of bright boundaries for the second generation.  
These studies have focused on public discourses surrounding social discrimination and 
tolerance toward Muslim immigrants, honor-killings, the hijab, sharia law and the 
construction of mosques in ways that conspicuously reinforce bright boundaries.  In 
their examination of the cultural integration of Muslim immigrants, for example, Bisin 
et. Al. (2008) compared national survey data of ethnic minorities in the UK to determine 
that “Muslims integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims” (445).  At the same 
time, research using survey data from Germany indicated that “individuals with strong 
religious commitments are less likely than secular individuals to hold egalitarian gender 
role attitudes” (Diehl, Koenig & Ruckdeschel, 2009:278).  These differences essentially 
reflect and duplicate debates over cultural values that “reinforce existing bright 
38 
boundaries, or a strong sense of us versus them, between immigrants from Muslim 
and/or Turkish backgrounds and the majority population” (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009). 
Lastly, the concept of religiosity has been used as a lens through which the 
conception and practice of Islam among Muslim immigrants has been measured, and 
also through which the integration of Muslim immigrants has been understood - 
especially in connection with intergenerational and cross-national analyses of structural 
integration.  Fleischmann and Phalet (2012), for instance, have tested hypotheses 
concerning whether “an inverse relationship between structural integration and 
religiosity” (320) can be predicted by secularization – measured at an institutional policy 
level across four European capital cities.  Similarly, Connor (2009) has explored levels of 
religiosity according to comparatively negative or positive ‘contexts of immigrant 
receptivity’ and found that “less welcoming immigrant contexts are associated with 
higher religious outcomes among Muslim immigrants in comparison to the host region’s 
religiosity” (376).  In each of these cases, it becomes clear that studies of Muslim 
immigrant religiosity fundamentally reflect the assumptions of the host nations in which 
they are conducted, feeding back into discourses on discrimination by and against 
Muslim immigrants and the maintenance of bright boundaries reinforcing a prevailing 
‘us versus them’ mentality in the European context. 
The measurement of religiosity, it must also be said, has also been subjected to 
substantial critique: 
39 
  “To study the religiosity of Muslims by focusing, as many studies do, on 
conspicuously visible, vocal and devout practitioners is to risk reinforcing public 
understandings of Muslims as particularly (and dangerously) religious’ (Schmidt, 
2011, p.1217) on the one hand, and reproducing the ‘ideological aspiration of 
Islamist and Islamic revivalist movements’ on the other, with their ‘privileging of 
Islam as the supreme guideline of all fields of life’ (Schielke, 2010, p.2)” 
(Brubaker, 2012:6). 
Brubaker’s (2012) argument is compelling on several grounds. First, it highlights 
the unforeseen effects and unintended consequences of using ‘religiosity’ as a category 
of analysis - with respect to both public perceptions of Muslim immigrants as well as the 
political aspirations of Islamist ideologues and radical recruitment efforts in the West.  
Second, and more importantly, it reflects the tendency of researchers to conduct 
analyses of Muslim immigrants that are rooted in the assumptions of their own culture 
and religious heritage.  And unlike the research literature on cultural integration, which 
can also reflect culturally-rooted assumptions of the host nation, critiquing religiosity 
appears to be a much more theoretically-based endeavor.   
Thus, the European research literature can be seen to reflect a continuum 
between empirical accounts of structural integration for the second generation that 
tend to avoid or otherwise circumnavigate the normative, theory-laden issues defining 
bright boundaries for Muslims in Europe and research efforts that engage more directly 
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with political conflicts and religio-cultural differences between Muslim immigrants and 
European natives.  The danger, in this sense, is twofold: between the cold vacuum of 
statistical abstraction and the partial blindness that comes from staring perpetually at 
the sun.  There does not appear to be a clear path in between, moreover, yet it has 
been walked with encouraging degrees of success by scholars committed to exploring 
the European context. 
In summary, the European research literature reflects one of Alba’s (2005) 
primary findings: that bright boundaries not only exist, but are also highly salient among 
the broader public and thus deeply consequential for second-generation Muslim 
immigrants.  Research on economic and educational attainment frequently highlights 
the role of structural barriers and discrimination, indicating Muslims in Europe are 
possibly experiencing segmented assimilation (Stepick & Dutton Stepick, 2010).  
Research on cultural integration and religiosity, furthermore, has highlighted the degree 
to which bright boundaries between Muslim immigrants and the native majority can 
retard integration and exacerbate already confusing discourses around religious and 
cultural values.  In Europe, where Muslims are also the largest single-ethnicity 
immigrant minority populations in each nation, the effects of post-9/11 contexts of 
reception have not boded well for structural integration of their communities.  Cultural 
integration also remains a primary object of concern for European publics in this 
context. In Alexander’s (2013) words, the debate in Europe “is not over whether 
immigrants should be incorporated, but over the grounds for doing so” (531).   
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Research on Second-Generation Muslim Immigrants in the U.S. 
The sociological research literature on the Muslim second generation in the U.S. 
is comparatively sparse relative to Europe, and even then only partial and indirect in its 
focus on the second generation.  Research on economic achievement and educational 
attainment focuses largely on specific ethnic groups, such as Lebanese and Somali 
immigrants (Ajrouch & Kusow, 2007; Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007) that often entail subsets of 
atheists, Christians and Muslims within them.  Cainkar’s (2004) analysis of Islamic 
revivalism among second-generation Arab-American Muslims is perhaps the most 
specific example of research focusing on second generation Muslim Americans.  While it 
omits non-Arabs, most notably Iranian-Americans, it engages specifically with the 
research literature in identifying religion as a critical explanatory factor and addresses 
the position of second generation Muslim Arab-Americans at the crossroads of 
globalization and local sociopolitical environments.  
Cainkar’s (2004) work focuses on Islamic revivalism in the historical context of 
U.S. Muslims and not specifically on the impact of post-9/11 contexts of reception on 
second-generation immigrant Muslims in the U.S. This represents a deviation from much 
of the U.S. and European research literature on second generation Muslims. The author 
is explicit on this point, citing a footnote in Roy’s (2004) Globalized Islam in which it is 
considered “increasingly irrelevant to study Islam in the West through the prism of 
immigration” (8). With a word of agreement, the author turns her focus away from 
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immigration and toward religiosity, where “intensely personal experiences” (Cainkar, 
2004:103) can be better explored at the individual level through ethnographic analysis 
and ‘oral history research’ (in this particular case within the Chicago Metropolitan area).  
This justification is perplexing, however, when considering the context of Roy’s (2004) 
footnote: it calls for a religious anthropology of Islam to develop in the European 
context, where Muslim immigrants are also often the single largest geographically-
segregated and ethnically-homogenous minority groups in host nations.  His preceding 
discussion on the matter focuses specifically on Western Europe, and on the city of Paris 
in particular. Applying Roy’s (2004) comment to the U.S. context involves eliding this 
important difference.  This research holds, by contrast, that the transatlantic divide is 
crucial for understanding the relevance of immigration for developing an anthropology 
of Islam in the U.S. context. 
In the U.S., the character of Muslim immigration is fundamentally different (not 
to mention the character of immigration generally).  Here Muslim immigration has been 
as ethnically-diverse as it has been geographically diffuse, casting legitimate doubt on 
the purported ‘irrelevance’ of immigration as analytical lens for American Islam.  
Cainkar’s (2004) concluding predictions: that “knowledge of American methods of 
organizing will increase Muslim civic political integration in American society…” (118) 
and that “the complex dialectic between Islam and the West will continue to unfold as 
Islam becomes institutionally and socially acknowledged as an American religion,” are 
thus vague and largely generalized.  In this research, the turn toward religiosity and 
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away from immigration appears to have been a fateful decision – one which has 
privileged domestic historical and contemporary political discourses over the eminently 
consequential forces of globalization and transnational connectivity in its analysis of 
Islamic revivalism. This research has deliberately avoided such an approach in the 
interest of maintaining a genuinely exploratory focus and avoiding its attendant 
scholarly liabilities.   
Despite the comparatively minimal attention paid toward second-generation 
Muslim immigrants in the U.S. relative to their European counterparts,  research in the 
U.S. has focused on several aspects of post-9/11 contexts of reception that remain 
relevant for the second generation today.  Vidino (2004), for example, highlights the 
visibility of jihadist networks “which were virtually ignored before 9/11” (6).  The impact 
of 9/11 in the U.S. thus also catapulted Muslim immigrants into the public sphere by 
mere association, and into public debate as public figures, auguring what Gole (2011) 
has referred to as the “tumultuous transition of Muslims from the status of the invisible 
migrant-worker to that of visible Muslim citizenship” (383).  Finally, Naber (2006) has 
documented the incorporation of this disproportionate visibility into the domestic 
discourses of traditionally marginalized groups in the U.S., with particular attention paid 
to race and gender. 
A second line of research has focused on gender, and second generation Muslim 
immigrant women in particular, to address the second generation in conjunction with 
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contemporary discourses on women’s rights in the context of Muslim immigration.  Ali 
(2005), for example, explores the use of the hijab among second generation Muslim 
women.  His research explores both the Quranic understanding and social reasoning 
used by different women wearing the hijab, as well as how shifts in religious dress may 
also indicate shifts in religious practice among them.  Similar research by Williams & 
Vashi (2007) explores the use of the hijab among second generation Muslim-American 
women as a tool in the creation of autonomous spaces where they navigate between 
social and (largely familial) religious spaces.   
These works, among many others focusing on Muslim women in the U.S. 
context, touch on a broader strand of research literature in the U.S. that has extended 
Dubois’ conception of ‘double consciousness’ to include immigrant experiences. The 
‘two worlds’ effect brought on by demarcations between languages and cultures, 
between the inner world of family and the larger world of the host society, have been 
articulated compellingly within feminist tradition in sociology: 
“For a people who are neither Spanish nor live in a country in which Spanish if 
the first language; for a people who live in a country in which English is the 
reigning tongue but are not Anglo; for a people who cannot identify with 
standard (formal, Castillian) Spanish nor standard English, what recourse is left 
to them but to create their own language? A language which they can connect 
their identity to, one capable of communicating the realities and values true to 
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themselves – a language with terms that are neither espanol ni ingles, but both.  
We speak a patois, a forked tongue, a variation of two languages.” (Anzaldua, 
1987:35-36) 
Muslim immigrant women today have come to speak a patois of their own.  And 
it is within the heritage of this research literature that the ‘forked tongue’ of their lived 
realities and expressed values have been communicated and researched in the 
contemporary U.S. context.  While they have found a considerable diversity of literary 
expression, research focusing exclusively on Muslim immigrant women in the U.S. has 
also been used to examine the role of Mosques in the acculturation process (Ozyurt, 
2010). While members of the first generation were seen to use Mosques to recreate the 
culture of ‘back home’, second generation Muslim women were more predominantly 
involved in establishing “immigrant mosques whose administrators and religious leaders 
have a futuristic and integrationist conception of Islam... [and] are more successful in 
building bridges between their congregants and the larger society in general” (Ozyurt, 
2010:295).   
In summary, research on Muslims in the U.S. has tended so far to focus within 
specific ethnic groups that include non-Muslims, within religious categories such as 
‘Muslim’ that include multiple generations, or among second generation Muslim 
immigrant women to the exclusion of men.  Furthermore, while issues of structural and 
cultural integration are substantively addressed, akin to the European literature, the 
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focus on the Muslim second generation in the U.S. context has remained only partial 
and indirect.  There is thus a gap in the U.S. research literature regarding second 
generation Muslim immigrants within post-9/11 contexts of reception – one that might 
connect importantly with the European research literature while also reflecting the 
nature of the U.S. context.  
The importance of addressing this gap, beyond the intersection occupied by 
second generation Muslim immigrants between islamophobia and radicalization, is 
further evidenced by research on public attitudes toward Muslims in both Europe and 
the U.S.   Using survey data from 30 countries in Europe, Strabac & Listhaug (2007) 
conclude that “Muslims in Europe were particularly prone to becoming targets of 
prejudice, even before the attacks of September 11” (268).  At the same time, research 
employing social distance scales in the U.S., has found that while “Arabs reaped a 75% 
positive response for marrying into one’s family, with Muslims collecting a 68% similar 
response in the responses gathered prior to 9/11” (Parillo & Donoghue, 2005:264), 
results collected after September 11 “produced results tempered by the tragic events of 
that day” ranking Muslims and Arabs at the bottom of the scale, at a reported social 
distance greater than any other group.   
In this way, the European research literature more accurately reflects the bright 
boundaries that exist between Muslim immigrants and native non-Muslims in Europe.  
These attitudes are salient in the U.S. as well, as recent research shows, but Muslim 
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immigrants are not often researched directly as a contiguous group the way they are in 
Europe, in the very real context of their own bright boundary.  Thus, while negative 
public attitudes and bright boundaries for Muslim immigrants are consistently observed 
across European and American contexts, as a consistent consequence of post-9/11 
contexts of reception for the second generation, the direct identification and 
exploration of Muslim immigrants on these terms has occurred primarily in Europe.  This 
imbalance in research literatures on Muslim immigrants across the Atlantic divide 
highlights the importance of addressing the research gap identified above.   
Islamic Religious Identity Across Europe and the U.S. 
While the contemporary body of research literature spanning Europe and the 
U.S. illustrates the construction of both Localized and Globalized Islams among the 
second generation, it also highlights the role of family as a significant factor influencing 
boundary processes for Second-generation immigrants.  The following review suggests 
that, by all accounts, localized constructions of Islam account for the vast majority of 
Muslims in the U.S. and in Europe, representing what Portes & Rumbaut (2001) refer to 
as ‘linear ethnicity’.  A small but significant minority, however, are seen to construct a 
Globalized Islam in response to identity crises brought on by family conflicts and social 
and economic discrimination, representing what Portes & Rumbaut (2006) refer to as 
‘reactive ethnicity’, and what I refer to more broadly as ‘reactive identity’.  
Selective Acculturation: The Role of Family and Society 
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Foner (1997) has emphasized the impact of structural constraints (social and 
economic barriers) in shaping “the kinds of family arrangements, roles, and orientations 
that emerge among [immigrants in the U.S.]" (962).  Similarly, Portes & Rumbaut (2006) 
identify social and economic discrimination as one of the major determinants of 
downward assimilation for immigrant groups.  Muslims are, however, the lowest 
performing group in their ‘mean downward assimilation index’ (320), i.e. that they are 
the least likely to be downwardly mobile.  Portes & Rumbaut (2006) observe that “unlike 
the impoverished Muslim population in Great Britain and continental Europe, American 
Muslims have done rather well economically.  According to Baghy, the average mosque-
goer in the United States is a married man with children who has a bachelor’s degree or 
higher and earns about $74,000 a year” (338).  
Given that Muslims are not comparatively disadvantaged by structural 
constraints relative to other immigrant groups, the idea that “immigrants are not 
passive individuals who are acted upon by external forces. They play an active role in 
reconstructing and redefining family life” (Foner, 1997:962) may hold greater relevance 
for Muslim immigrants in the U.S. context. In this environment, the dynamic of 
intergenerational conflict presents an opportunity for the younger generation (and 
women in particular) to “challenge certain aspects of traditional family systems while 
they also try to retain others” (Ibid).  
49 
Between the cultures immigrants bring with them - informed increasingly by 
transnational premigration frameworks and the post-9/11 contexts of reception that 
confront them in the U.S., the inner world of family becomes a place where there is a 
“dynamic interplay between structure, culture, and agency” (957) Thus, family and 
society constitute two sites where processes of selective acculturation play out for 
immigrants in the U.S. Islamic religious identity can also be seen as a vehicle that allows 
immigrants to navigate between these two sites within processes of selective 
acculturation.  With respect to religious identity, therefore, the key question is “whether 
or not religion can play a major role for immigrants and the second generation as a 
bridge to inclusion in the new society” (Foner & Alba, 2008). 
Localized Islam in the U.S. 
Because Muslim immigrant populations in the U.S. are both ethnically diverse 
and geographically diffuse, the current research literature has touched on the 
construction and maintenance of religious meaning among them in myriad ways. 
Studies focusing on the construction and maintenance of religious meaning in this 
context have primarily explored the intersection between religion and post-9/11 
politics.  Cainkar (2004), Duderija (2007) and Peek (2005) have specifically focused on 
the Muslim second generation and found that 9/11 not only reinforced the salience of 
Islamic religious identity within domestic political discourses, but also led to the 
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development of various Islamic revivalisms serving as the bases for various associations 
and solidarities to emerge among them.  
Other researchers, meanwhile, have focused on specific Muslim-majority ethnic 
groups at similar intersections of religious and political identities. Ajrouch & Kusow 
(2007), for example, found that Somali immigrants must deal with the dual challenges of 
race and religion in identity construction, while Lebanese immigrants are able to focus 
solely on the challenges of religious identity, facilitated importantly “by virtue of their 
white racial status” (72).  Similarly, Naber (2005;2006) has researched the cultural and 
psychological impacts of 9/11 on Arab Immigrants in the San Francisco area and found 
that, consistent with other research emphasizing the renewed salience of Islamic 
religious identity, public Muslim identities have been employed increasingly as an 
effective strategy by the second generation within domestic political discourses on both 
race and gender.  What has emerged in the U.S. research literature, therefore, has been 
both a recognition of the renewed salience of Islamic religious identity in response to 
9/11 as well as the diverse polyvalence of localized Islams in the construction of 
politically-salient religious identities.   
Globalized Islam among Immigrants in the U.S. and Europe 
The construction of Globalized Islam appears to be almost entirely reactive in 
character.  Reactive identity formation, Portes & Rumbaut (2006) note, “compromises 
selective acculturation when it is pitted against the beliefs and norms of parents, 
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although it may offer to some the chance to find the meaning and direction that, for 
some reason, they do not find at home” (p.336).  For a small minority, family conflicts 
meant to control and ensure upward mobility for the second generation lead instead to 
a break with the traditions and trajectories of the first generation. “As a result, the 
young are forced to seek alternative forms of ‘empowerment knowledge’, whether it is 
via the Internet, underground reading groups or religious study circles (Bunt, 2003). This 
knowledge is generally loaded with a radicalising message that promotes intolerance, 
antipathy and the often disregard of all things Western – evolved in the context of 
resistance politics of the oppressed and disempowered” (Abbas, 2012:350).  
Scholars observe this pattern to also occur in response to perceived social 
prejudice and marginalization among a small minority of second-generation Muslims.   
“Second-generation Muslims may still react to perceived discrimination and lack of 
mobility opportunities by embracing the preachings of radicalized imams.  This trend 
has been exemplified by the repeated presence of second-generation Muslims in 
terrorist attacks in Great Britain, France, and the United States” (Portes & Rumbaut, 
2006:343).  Sirseloudi (2012) agrees: “The more young Muslims (irrespective of their 
ethnic origin) identify with the global Ummah, rather than with either the country of 
origin of their parents or Germany, the more open they become to all kinds of Islamist 
streams” (p.818). 
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Where scholars observe the role of a culturally-rooted, flexible and localized 
Islam to strengthen immigrant communities and aid upward mobility, they observe its 
reactive construction to have the opposite effect.  A globalized Islam purged of local and 
cultural content, which is generally ideological and preoccupied with a ‘pristine past’, 
actively opposes assimilation into the mainstream host culture.  According to Sirseloudi 
(2012), it is this “separation of culture and religion, [that] has a radicalising effect when 
combined with experiences of discrimination and low opportunity for integration” (Ibid). 
Family conflicts can leave second-generation Muslims “seeking a ‘purer’ form of Islam 
than that practiced by their parents” (Nagel & Staeheli, 2011:441). Voas & Fleischmann 
(2012) also find that “immigrant parents are surprised by their children’s rejection of 
some traditions as non-Islamic and their determination to return to a ‘real Islam’” 
(p.534). Efforts by the second generation to “appropriate an Islam that is separate from 
the ethnic culture of the parental generation” (Ibid) is a consistent theme documented 
by scholars among the Muslim second generation as an active response to both family 
conflicts with parents, as well as perceived discrimination and social marginalization.    
Research Hypothesis 
This research was initially driven by the observation that the shift to negative 
post-9/11 contexts of reception and the emergence of newly bright boundaries had 
increased the quantity and severity of discrimination experienced by second-generation 
Muslim immigrants.  In response, it was hypothesized that the research interviews 
53 
would encounter and reflect accounts of both Localized and Globalized Islams, placing 
the focus of subsequent analysis on the consequences of Globalized Islam among the 
second generation and the various factors associated with its emergence.   
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Chapter 4 
Research Methods 
This exploratory study aims to illuminate the intersection occupied second-
generation Muslim immigrants within post-9/11 contexts of reception in the U.S., as 
well as investigate how religious meaning is constructed and maintained by this 
population.  It’s goals are twofold: first, to give voice to an underrepresented group; and 
second, to identify specific hypothesis and fertile grounds for future research.  Being 
wary of the potential for unwarranted assumptions to become embedded within the 
research design and questions, semi-structured in-depth interviews were chosen as the 
primary research method because they would allow for both an exploration of the 
complex intersection under review, as well as an opportunity for the researcher and 
interview participants to interact more openly and freely with one another around the 
topic or question at hand.  
In this way, this research sought to confront interview participants with 
questions that reflected the tensions of their lived experience while also giving them 
space to assert their own perspective and beliefs in response.  This research method 
also allowed for an evolution of the interviews through an iterative process that 
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constantly sought and incorporated feedback from participants into future interviews. 
In addition to exploring their experiences and reactions to post-9/11 contexts of 
reception, this study also aims to establish a larger exploration of the political claims 
about Islam within contemporary public discourses in the U.S.  It therefore seeks to 
explore what Islam actually ‘is’ among this population at an empirical level, and by 
extension, who exactly Muslim immigrants in the U.S. ‘are’. 
Access & Recruitment 
The research population for this study was defined to include adults born in the 
U.S. between the ages of 18 and 35 who have at least one parent who is an immigrant 
from a Muslim-majority country.  This age range allowed for a comparative analysis 
between those who remember the September 11 attacks vividly in early adulthood and 
those who barely remember the event at all from early childhood, being in some cases 
only 3 or 4 at the time of occurrence in 2001.  More than this, the age group represents 
the millennial generational cohort.  In addition to exploring differences between those 
who were comparatively younger or older in 2001, a distinct and well-documented 
generational perspective importantly emerges as a relevant and potentially useful factor 
for analysis in this regard.  Confining the sample to a single generational cohort also 
allows for relevant generational comparisons between native and non-immigrant 
millennials in the U.S. In other words, even though there is no clear successive 
numerical designation of natives the way there is with immigrants, the ‘millenial’ may 
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serve as a de facto category of analysis between second generation immigrants and the 
children of the native-born.  Finally, the requirement that at least one parent be a first-
generation Muslim immigrant served to keep the criteria for inclusion open to Second-
generation immigrants of mixed ancestry while explicitly avoiding converts – an issue 
which would likely raise entirely different questions that are neither anticipated by the 
research design nor explicitly sought by the research questions. 
Interview participants were recruited using convenience sampling.  
Organizations that identified as ‘Islamic’ as well as those from Muslim-majority 
ethnicities and nationalities were solicited by the researcher for access to their 
membership populations for the purposes of recruitment.  Those organizations whose 
mission was explicitly religious did not grant access to their membership populations.  
Those organizations whose mission was explicitly educational, or associative in the 
public sphere, frequently granted access to their membership populations for 
recruitment, passed on notice of the research opportunity to others who wanted to 
‘discuss their experiences in post-9/11 America’, and had even offered their 
administrators for participation in the research.  Public events with titles such as ‘voices 
against Islamophobia’ and ‘Muslim voices against extremism’ also served as fertile 
venues to discuss the research study with potential participants, which included 
members of public, educational, and religious organizations.   
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The primary challenges to access and recruitment of research participants, for 
organizations and individuals alike, took three primary forms – each of which presented 
significant challenges to the recruitment process, not all of which were expected.  First, 
the strain of public inquiry surrounding current events resulted in a heavy barrage of 
requests for meetings and interviews with a range of entities, public and private, 
educational and religious, political and apolitical.  Every organization I encountered 
described being inundated by this wave of outreach and inquiry following terror attacks 
resulting in long queues of interview and meeting requests that they simply could not, 
and often did not want, to keep up with.   
During the recruitment period from January to April of 2016, two tragic events 
allowed this dynamic persist while I attempted to recruit research participants.  The first 
were the Paris attacks coordinated throughout the city to target civilians in mid-
November of 2015.  January and February of 2016 were spent dealing with the social 
and political fallout from this event for many student and community organizations as 
well as mosques. By mid-March, when it had finally become easier to make contact 
organizations and discuss my research my efforts were beginning to bear more fruit 
when the second major event, the Brussels airport bombings, killed or injured more 
than 300 civilians in Belgium and reignited the tense social and political atmospheres 
that had made recruitment so difficult in the early months of January and February.   
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In response to this environment, all I could do was remain persistent – aiming to 
elevate the request for interview participation above others on the grounds that it was 
scholarly research being undertaken at a public university.  In many cases this tactic was 
successful, eventually resulting in enough contacts and subsequent interviews to 
complete the research effort.  Socially tense and politically contentious environments 
did also, however, create serious problems for conducting exploratory research across 
the larger geography of the Pacific Northwest as I had planned.  Due to additional time 
constraints and contact/scheduling difficulties, the Seattle Metropolitan Area, initially 
included in the geographical sphere of this research along with a goal of 20 interviews, 
was excluded, leaving 10 interviews to be conducted throughout the Portland 
Metropolitan Area.  Even this was difficult to achieve given the national political climate 
and the measures Islamic organizations and local communities were taking to address 
matters and remain proactive on their own.   
Second, suspicion of the intentions or motivations underlying the research – 
largely due to its subject matter focus on Muslims, was a significant but less daunting 
challenge.  When encountered, especially at Mosques but also among some individuals 
at public events, the nature and purpose of the research needed to be openly and 
candidly discussed in a manner that sought to address these issues.  While my 
willingness to do so was enough to address the concerns of some, it was not enough for 
others.  Given the social and political environment described above, this often became a 
connected secondary concern that further vexed my initial efforts.  
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The third challenge had to do with potential familial and communal 
repercussions related to research participation.  While the research ostensibly sought to 
explore the experiences of second-generation Muslim immigrants in a post-9/11 
America (“if you don’t speak up for your experience, someone else will” was a frequent 
appeal I made) it inevitably dealt with interstitial interactions between faith, family and 
the larger community that bound them together.  This factor alone, in my opinion, 
explains the majority of the resistance I encountered at Mosques and other explicitly 
religious organizational gatherings.  If someone’s daughter or son were to participate 
and be identified in the research material contributing to harmful stereotypes or worse, 
they inadvertently help forward a research agenda perceived in some way to work 
against Muslims in the U.S., such exposure would constitute a liability for the family and 
the local communities to which they may be tied.  As such, when weighed against 
possible familial and communal repercussions, the opportunity for research in these 
contexts may constitute an unwarranted risk for individuals and communities who feel 
as though they are weathering a larger social and political ‘storm’.   
To address these challenges, I relied to a large extent on my Iranian background, 
knowledge of Islamic cultures and norms, and existing personal relationships with the 
larger Muslim-American community to gain entrée.  My mother was born in Iran and in 
the late 1970’s, with some twelve members of her family, emigrated to Salem, Oregon.  
I spent my first birthday in 1982 in Iran, in the towns of Karraj and Arak, during the Iran-
Iraq war.  I returned again in 1985 and 1990, spending a total of nearly one year being 
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raised there, often returning with a thick accent – more proficient in Farsi than English.  I 
believed this helped get interviews with Iranians, and to this end also think that it would 
have been even better if I spoke Arabic as well.   
For some of the groups I approached for participants, the fatigue of constant 
inquiries and interview requests meant that they no longer had the capacity (nor at 
times even the inclination) to begin evaluating each request’s respective merits.  And 
while my general persistence and continual reminders that I was engaged in university 
research were effective in raising my profile to a large degree, I also relied on 
introducing myself as ‘Shahriyar’ to establish a very real familiarity, an ‘insider status’ 
that would encourage responses under the auspices of customary and normative 
familiarity and respect.  Combined with my resources on Portland State University 
campus, and the helpful advice and cooperation of faculty and engaged community 
members and student leaders, I was able to eventually gain access to a range of groups 
both on and off campus and successfully recruit after considerable effort and delay, in 
person using convenience sampling, a total of 10 research participants.   
Three participants were recruited at public events – both on Portland State 
University campus, but which included a majority of non-students in the form of 
interested community members and issue-organization representatives. Three other 
participants were recruited from Islamic student groups at the university. The final four 
were recruited from national and ethnic organizations that had met at the university in 
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the past, but predominantly gathered at venues throughout the larger Portland 
Metropolitan area – of the five Iranians included in the research sample, four were 
recruited in this way.  This also reflects the extent to which I had to rely on personal 
entre within the Iranian-American community in Portland and my knowledge and use of 
Farsi to gain access to potential interview participants. 
Five Iranians, two Palestinians, a Jordanian, a Yemeni and a Bosnian provided 
both a healthy diversity from within the Muslim world, as well as a more accurate 
proportional representation of Muslim immigrants in the U.S., with Persians and Arabs 
being much closer in their respective populations counts than outside the U.S., 
according to the 2010 U.S. census and other organizational estimates.  Country of origin 
was seen as potentially important factor for two reasons: first, Alba’s (2005) work on 
second generation immigrants in Europe and the U.S. highlights the ‘path dependence’ 
of different groups.  Ignoring the historical and cultural diversity represented by each 
Muslim immigrant group’s country of origin would be potentially reductive in assuming 
a uniformity in the respective impacts of their different histories and cultures in relation 
to the research questions.  Second, different countries of origin conform to different 
sectarian divisions within Islam.  Iranians, for example, are overwhelmingly Shia while 
most Arab nations are Sunni.  Within each Sunni-majority nation, moreover, different 
political histories and minority groups structure attitudes and practices in different ways 
– with the Druze in Lebanon and Syria and the Copts in Egypt being prime examples.
Lastly, four women and six men represented a sample tilted more toward men, but 
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given my initial concerns for female participation, among both Persian and Arab 
immigrants, this was something I decided to work with and account for given my small 
sample size, and exploratory nature of pilot research in general.   
Research Sample 
Table 1. 
Portland, Oregon as a Strategic Research Site 
Prior research on New York and Los Angeles has highlighted the comparatively 
favorable effect particular geographies can create for second generation immigrants 
(Kasinitz, Mollenkopf & Waters, 2004; Kasinitz et. al., 2008).  While these authors have 
focused on the legacies of prior waves of immigration in shaping these unique 
Gender Age Occupation Education Married Country of Origin
Mahdi Male 35 Unemployed Bachelors No Iran
Hassan Male 32 Student High School No Iran
Jafar Male 21 Student High School No Palestine
Farah Female 19 Student High School No Yemen
Sholeh Female 27 Auditor Bachelors No Jordan
Ali Male 35 Entrepreneur Associates Yes Iran
Maryam Female 34 Pharmacist Doctorate Yes Iran
Shahin Male 34 Business Analyst Masters No Bosnia
Nemah Male 24 Bank Teller Bachelors No Iran
Marjan Female 27 Student Bachelors No Palestine
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environments for the children of immigrants, Alba & Nee (2003) have highlighted 
several elements that may help to explain the comparative favorability of some contexts 
of reception in these cities that vary from other national, regional and local contexts. In 
their formulation of New Assimilation Theory, they identify 1) the valorization of 
inclusion among mainstream institutions, 2) a resultant belief that public institutions will 
protect immigrants from social and economic discrimination in the public sphere – and 
especially in the work place, and 3) the reasonable predictability of parity of life chances 
with their peers in the mainstream.  “The valorization of inclusion has been sufficient to 
produce public and private policies intended to foster it within the framework of 
equality under the law […] diversity as a social value has gained support in many sectors 
of the American mainstream” (Alba & Nee, 2003:280).  New Assimilation Theory, 
therefore, “highlights the role of the state by implicating it directly in the institutional 
mechanisms that ensure reasonably predictable chances of success for the second and 
third generations [of immigrants]” (281).   
Portland has been the identified by numerous research studies as a site of the 
‘new urbanism’ (Jarvis & Bonnett, 2013; Trudeau & Kaplan, 2016; Song & Knaap, 2003; 
Lund, 2003; Cabrera et. al, 2016), which focuses on the reduction of urban sprawl, the 
integration of work and residence, the city and natural environment, and the 
construction of open spaces that promote integration of new residents into established 
communities and discourage residential segregation.  Portland also has a reputation of 
being a politically progressive city consonant with the ‘valorization of inclusion’ that 
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Alba & Nee (2003) describe, as well as a history of working to engage local communities 
through local governments in developing the new urbanism referenced above.  As such, 
it is seen as a unique environment that has not escaped ubiquity of post-9/11 contexts 
of reception and their transformative effects at the national level, but nevertheless 
managed to mitigate its more extreme effects in maintaining a comparatively favorable 
context of reception in the manner of its ‘new urbanism’.   
The importance of this unique environment for exploratory research lies in its 
distinctiveness. First, research participants may be more likely to explicitly reference 
and interact with such an environment in their answers to interview questions – i.e. 
Portland makes often much ado about itself, so they may make much ado about it as 
well or have an opinion where they otherwise would not. This awareness of place, and 
of the public intentionality with which the state is implicated in the institutional 
mechanisms that drive the function and development of the city, is of significant utility 
in the exploration of how individuals perceive public attitudes in a variety of contexts, 
how they relate themselves to the mainstream, and how confidently they can estimate 
a reasonable predictability of life chances relative to the mainstream.   Second, the 
distinctiveness of Portland may allow for the triangulation of research results, 
specifically as they may pertain to other geographies.  For example, a potential result 
(x), given what we know about Portland relative to another city (y), gives rise to the 
following question (z).  In this manner, pilot research is here conducted with the 
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relatability of its distinctive geographical setting in mind for the purposes and 
implications of future research. 
Interview Protocol 
The interview protocol (Appendix A) was comprised of five sections.  The first, on 
Islam, sought to explore and probe the construction and maintenance of religious 
meaning in the context of political identity (Mamdani, 2002).  Particular emphasis was 
placed on identifying the form of historical consciousness operating at the heart of how 
they understood Islam.  Participants were asked to define Islam ‘in their own words’ and 
if they saw more similarities or differences between themselves and other Muslims on 
the question. They were asked three further questions designed to explore the fault 
lines between Localized Islam and Globalized Islam. These focused on the role of takfir, 
the pronouncement of other Muslims as ‘non-Muslims’, the historical role of national, 
ethnic and familial identity in shaping Islam, and lastly the role of local traditions and 
cultures – whether they ‘add to or subtract from it’.  In this way, the research protocol 
sought to enable a comparative focus of the way participants actualized their historical 
consciousness in describing their respective opinions on nationality, ethnicity, family, 
and local traditions and cultures. This section also gave research participants the 
opportunity to more openly speak to the broader definition of Islam, in both abstract 
and practical terms in the context of their lives as Second-generation Muslim 
immigrants in the U.S. 
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The second section of the research protocol focuses explicitly on the U.S. 
mainstream and sought to gauge experiences and reactions to post-9/11 contexts of 
reception, as well as their conception of self in relation to the broader society.  The first 
two questions explored whether living in the U.S. ‘helped or hindered’ their practice of 
Islam and whether they saw U.S. society as ‘more friendly or more hostile towards 
Muslims and Islam’.  In addition to intersecting with the questions on Islam, these 
questions aimed to measure their experiences of post-9/11 contexts of reception 
through the lens of political identity.  The following two questions directly focused on 
their predictability of life chances , where they are asked to define success and then 
assess their ability to achieve it, and their place as either ‘inside or outside’ of the U.S. 
mainstream.  Finally, they were asked about any tension points they observed between 
their lives as Muslims and as Americans, and whether they lived ‘in two worlds or one, 
or both’.  These last sets of questions were designed to directly explore Alba & Nee’s 
(2003) criteria for assimilation into the mainstream as well as the boundary processes 
outlined by Alba (2005) and by Portes and Rumbaut (2001).   
The third and fourth sections explore two factors relevant to both constructions 
of Islam and the U.S. mainstream: family relationships and peer networks.  Specifically, 
Foner’s (1997) account of family as an ‘inner world’ where a dynamic interplay exists 
between culture, structure, and agency, as well as Portes & Rumbaut’s (2006) role of 
religion as a source of ‘refuge, respect, and resources’ guided the this section to explore 
the role of religion in family relationships and the presence or absence of conflict 
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related to processes of selective acculturation. The section on peer networks sought to 
gauge their level of social activity and the primary means of interaction, whether it was 
predominantly person-to-person, long distance contact or social media-based. Finally, 
the last section had basic demographic questions on age, occupation, education, marital 
status, and family country of origin.   
Conducting the Interviews 
A total of 10 interviews were conducted from January 2010 to April 2010 
throughout the Portland Metropolitan Area.  Interview sites consisted of restaurants, 
coffee shops, and open places such as public plazas and parks.  Interviews lasted an 
average of 30 minutes and were electronically recorded using a mobile recording 
device.  This figure reflects considerable divergences between interviews, with the 
longest lasting 40 minutes – more consistent with the length of interviews found in 
exploratory research.  Others, however, lasted between 15 and 20 minutes, with the 
shortest at 7 minutes.  The shortest interview, for example, consisted of short one-word 
answers, or strong opinionated statements with long pauses and silences in between.  
Prompts to continue were met with silence, and some questions were passed on 
altogether.  Some of the intermediate-length interviews saw participants elaborate at 
length in some sections, only to provide short responses in others.   
Finally, as the interviews progressed overall times did increase as I became more 
adept at approaching questions in a manner that anticipated and avoided the lapses and 
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tensions that brought discussions to a quicker end in prior interviews.  Even though 
interviews were comparatively shorter than I would have liked, it is important to note 
that research participants were confronted with a complex array of interlocking 
questions on topics of considerable public, private, and familial tension. For their part 
the research participants, even when curt, were to the point and managed to provide a 
relatively rich base of data from which to draw for the purposes of exploratory research. 
They were then transcribed on an ongoing basis as interviews were completed 
and stored on an encrypted password-protected hard drive.  Interview participants were 
required to view and voluntarily sign an informed consent form (Appendix B) in order to 
participate in this research study and before the interview could begin.  Each interview 
participant was also given added verbal assurance of strict anonymity and the use of 
pseudonyms during transcription and coding.   
The interviews appear to have gone quite well, with no incident or adverse 
reactions from research participants.  There were several moments when respondents 
paused to think about a question or ‘get comfortable’, particularly on the section on 
Islam.  As the interviews continued on into subsequent sections, participants who had 
given short answers or skipped questions in the section on Islam would return to earlier 
questions and link them with other responses, or speak in greater depth to answers 
they had given earlier.  Several interview participants described the interviews as ‘fun’ 
and ‘exciting’, explaining that they realized they enjoyed being able to speak to an 
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intersection they rarely were given the opportunity discuss and themselves rarely 
thought about. 
Data Analysis 
Research interviews were conducted and transcribed in three waves.  Emergent 
themes were identified in each and used to adjust the next interview protocol 
accordingly. Taken together, the identified emergent themes guided not only the 
cumulative progression of the research process, but also the comparative analysis of 
interviews in individual relation to one another within the research protocol.  Rather 
than a random or ad hoc selection of questions for comparison across interviews, using 
the emergent themes to identify questions for comparison between the interviews 
allowed for a linearity of analysis between the research as it was unfolding and the 
research in its final form.  What emerged had been progressively explored in greater 
depth by focusing on specific questions in successive iterations of the interview process. 
These questions were later identified as the basis for comparisons between interviews, 
thus allowing for nuanced contextual understanding at a relatively high level of thematic 
abstraction. 
While the earlier interviews did not benefit from the insights of themes that 
emerged from them, they remain an important part of a cumulative record upon which 
the rest are based.  Thus, the content of earlier interviews remains of sufficient 
substance and quality such that, while later interviews benefited from new insights and 
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observations, they remain equal in qualitative terms with every other interview as 
mutually-constitutive elements of a continuous body of research data. 
The first set of emergent themes concerned three primary issues.  First, that 
participants expressed sentiments that appeared to conform to both Globalized Islam 
and Localized Islam, but did not break cleanly between the two.  There was an apparent 
continuum between the two that I explored in greater detail during the later interviews. 
Second, the research participants recognized the existence of Islamophobia and 
discrimination, but also held to a reasonable belief in the protections afforded to them 
by mainstream institutions in the public sphere, as well as in their future life chances 
relative to other groups.  In other words, while they acknowledged Islamophobia, they 
did not think that it would affect their integration into U.S. society.  Third, there were 
apparent tensions between family life and U.S. society. Research participants frequently 
centered on negotiating between these two worlds such that they avoided conflict, 
never ‘coming to a head’ so to speak. 
The second set of emergent themes focused almost exclusively on the impact of 
gender.  The first research participant in this second group, Farah, even gave feedback 
on the order of the sections after her interview – suggesting that the order between the 
first section, which was on Islam, and second section, which was on U.S. Society, be 
switched in order to ease into a discussion of Islam after U.S. society.  I took this advice 
and found it to be useful in getting more out of participants on the section on Islam 
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without losing anything on the U.S. society.  The first emergent theme concerned the 
link between women and localized Islam.  In addition to being more strident in 
defending the role of local customs and traditions within Islam, they also began to 
emerge as ‘cultural lynchpins’, or as I began to see them: as ‘performers and 
reproducers of culture’ around which family groups and ethnic identity were centered. 
Hence, the second emergent theme focused on the role of women in constructing 
religion as a ‘glue’ binding family together and representing national and ethnic realities 
which remain meaningful for immigrant groups in the U.S.  Finally, women spoke of 
living ‘between two worlds’, while men had either expressed feeling like they lived in 
‘one world’ or ‘within one or the other’.   
The relative complexity of these observations over time, viewed across the 
twenty questions present in the research protocol, gradually narrowed the analytical 
focus down to several key questions, specifically questions 1 and 3 on Islam, questions 
6, 8, 9 and 11 on U.S. Society, and questions 12, 13 and 14 on family (Appendix A).  
These themes allowed for a relatively straightforward comparison of interview 
transcripts.  Thus, no data analysis program was used because of the continuities 
present in the application and development of the research protocol and data analysis 
itself.  Added to this the relatively small number of interviews, it was determined that 
what was ultimately a manageable task requiring only ink and paper to conduct manual 
scissor-sorting, to use an antiquated methodological term, could be complicated by 
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adding an unnecessary middle step that costly in terms of both time and effort and 
gaining little in return. 
Limitations 
The limitations of this research extend primarily to issues of generalizability, and 
also to the nature of the sampling method.  The research focused on Portland as a 
strategic research site, and while there may also be other such sites with similar 
qualifications, there are a greater number of divergent than convergent geographies in 
this sense.  Thus the results of this research are tied to the distinct geography in which it 
was conducted.  Furthermore, with a sample size of 10 interviews no meaningful 
statistical generalization is possible.  This research can only be regarded in future 
research as a source of primarily theoretical and only limited empirical contributions.   
The representativeness of the sample, while closer to the description of the 
‘average Muslim man in the U.S.’ offered by Portes & Rumbaut (2006) nevertheless 
reflects assumptions about the first generation of Muslim immigrants.  In order to 
construct a truly representative sample for the second generation, such a composition 
must be balanced against reliable data that paints a more accurate picture of this 
population within the larger research literature.  Lastly, convenience sampling was a 
way to ‘break in’ to an area of study for the purposes of pilot research.  It does not 
represent a reliable sampling method for future research.  Alternative sampling 
methods should be considered accordingly in future research. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis & Findings 
The results of this study are here organized into two sections.  The first presents 
findings on Research Question #1 and identifies two important factors that I believe 
should be the focus of future research: public institutions and gender.  It further offers a 
hypothetical model for understanding the differential effects various actors within 
public and private domains can have as sources of discrimination.  The section 
concludes with a discussion of how research participants have responded to the 
emergence of bright boundaries within post-9/11 contexts of reception by engaging in 
‘boundary shifting’. 
The second section presents findings on Research Question #2, identifying family 
and the context of reception as two sites where the construction and maintenance of 
religious meaning are seen to occur.  The unique complexities of selective acculturation 
processes are identified as a useful analytical concept for future research on 
constructions of Islam with respect to second generation Muslim immigrants.  It 
concludes by outlining a hypothetical typology of different constructions of Islam among 
research participants, and presents a vignette of each type as potential grounds for 
future research. 
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Section 1: 
Research Question #1: How have Second-generation Muslim immigrants experienced 
and reacted to post-9/11 contexts of reception? 
While the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 may have 
fundamentally altered the context of reception for Muslim immigrants in the United 
States, second generation Muslim immigrants are continuing to assimilate as previous 
generations of Muslim immigrants have done before them (Gest, 2012; Wike & Grim, 
2010). While the paths they navigate today are certainly more complex, politicized, and 
often fraught with controversy, second-generation Muslim immigrants who participated 
in this study continue to resemble the image of their parental generation: as an 
upwardly mobile group focused on economic achievement and educational attainment, 
who exhibit confidence in the protections afforded to them by public institutions as well 
as a positive view of their life chances relative to other groups in the U.S. This resembled 
linear and not reactive ethnicity according to Portes & Rumbaut’s (2006) analysis or 
religion outlined in my theoretical framework.  The research findings speak to each part 
of the research question concerning both experiences and reactions to post-9/11 
contexts of reception.   
Presented first is an in-depth account of experiences of discrimination. At critical 
issue appears to be the role played by public institutions and gender.  With respect to 
their reactions, interview participants exhibited a strong confidence in the protections 
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afforded to them by state institutions in the public sphere. Building on this, second-
generation Muslim immigrants appear to further react to post-9/11 contexts of 
reception by redrawing bright boundaries, moving them to include themselves within 
the American mainstream as genuine members who are similarly alarmed by Islamic 
terrorism and mutually invested with fellow citizens in the fight against violence and 
extremism.  
Finding #1: Experiences of Discrimination in the U.S. – The Role of Public Institutions and 
Gender 
Research participants clearly and candidly recounted their experiences of 
discrimination.  They indicated an awareness of discrimination toward Muslims in the 
U.S. as well as an awareness of the historical legacy of discrimination in the U.S. more 
generally.  Shahin, for example, observes that “racism in this country is still a prevalent 
issue. Basing somebody’s skin color, or name even, if it sounds Muslim, there’s already a 
judgment cast upon a person. So do I believe it exists? Yes. Do I believe it is hindering 
somebody to be successful? No.”  In exploring this apparent resilience during the 
interviews, two primary dichotomies emerged and appeared to function as evaluative 
criteria in specific contexts: ‘ignorance versus culpability’, and ‘individuals versus 
institutions’.  What emerges from my subsequent analysis of these two dichotomies is a 
framework that roughly indicates the relative consequentiality of some events and the 
relative inconsequentiality of others.    
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In post-9/11 contexts of reception, for example, discrimination is experienced 
within a variety of contexts and from a variety of directions.  Individuals and institutions 
acting across public and private spheres can have dramatically different impacts as 
different sources of discrimination.  Private individuals, for example, are seen as the 
most inconsequential – easily and often dismissed as ‘ignorant’ by research participants 
who feel supported and protected by state institutions.  Public institutions, , usually 
represented by the state however, have a lasting and transformative effect as sources of 
discrimination for second generation Muslim immigrants, reinforcing the significance of 
the state as an actor in what Alba & Nee (2003) have described as processes of ‘new 
assimilation’.   
The ‘Ignorance Versus Culpability’ Dichotomy 
The ‘ignorance versus culpability’ dichotomy appeared in relation to authority, or 
an authority figure. For example, participants recognized that various individuals may 
hold ignorant views and remain susceptible to Islamophobia for that reason. The case 
could be that, according to several research participants, an individual has not had the 
exposure or requisite experiences to challenge their existing views. The ‘door remains 
open’ for them to learn and grow, so to speak.  
Authority figures – those sanctioned with institutional power by virtue of a 
position they occupy or a status they hold (such as teachers, public officials, state 
agency administrators, police officers etc…), however, exist according to a different 
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evaluative criterion.  They should know better, by virtue of their position – whether it is 
because they have a responsibility to exercise power on behalf of the public good or 
because they represent a particular public institution. Their ignorance is not an excuse, 
the reasoning goes.  They are viewed as culpable by virtue of the structural position or 
role they occupy. This difference was manifested quite demonstrably during the 
interviews - defining the significance of some events and the insignificance of others. 
The most compelling example of the ‘ignorance versus culpability’ dichotomy 
came from Farah. She relays two stories.  The first involves a classmate asking her at 
school: “how do you feel now that your leader died?”, referring to the killing of Osama 
Bin Laden by U.S. Special Forces in 2011. Her response illustrated a view of the 
classmate as an individual: “so if I’m Muslim and he says he’s [Bin Laden] Muslim, then 
that means we’re absolutely the same, think the same. They think that I justified his 
actions just by being Muslim… They just don’t know any better, so I couldn’t blame 
them in a way.” She did not indicate the event to have shaken her or colored her 
experience of school or non-Muslims in any adverse way.   
Her second story involves a similar situation in high school, where she was 
allowed to take a test she had missed due to illness.  In the detention room where she 
was scheduled to take the exam because there would be a staff member present who 
could administer it, her backpack began beeping – an alarm she had forgotten about 
had gone off in her backpack.   
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“Two guys started saying ‘is that a bomb?’ … I was just like ‘that’s just my alarm, 
you guys are just being stupid’. And I didn’t care about that, cause they’re just 
idiot guys. Again it just goes back to how I thought about it [as ignorance]. But 
then the teacher that was there, she was like, ‘oh I’m really glad, I thought you 
were going to explode on us.’ That’s what she said to me. Yeah, and this is an 
adult, somebody who I really thought would stand up to the bullying I was 
getting and say something against it… I was absolutely speechless. I didn’t even 
say anything. I just sat down…”  
The event shook her because the teacher was not simply another ignorant 
person she could forgive; she was an authority figure – a part of the broader 
institutional structure she relied upon for the basic sense of safety and security required 
to forgive the ignorance of others, instead of being affected by it.  Similar examples put 
forward by research participants included irresponsible portrayals of Muslims in the U.S. 
media as well as ignorant and inflammatory speech by major candidates for national 
political office. In each case the event is more significant than, and goes importantly 
beyond, the relative inconsequentiality of individual ignorance.  Perceptions of 
ignorance in the context of legitimate power and sanctioned authority structures, 
according to this study, do not appear to be at all inconsequential for the children of 
Muslim immigrants. Rather, they appeared to affect research participants on a deeper 
level.   
79 
While this research is strictly exploratory, it can offer a tentative hypothesis as to 
why this is: authority figures ostensibly represent the state.  Their actions, therefore, 
can hypothetically be seen to reflect upon state institutions and the character of the 
host nation in general.  This could be disruptive on a deeper level for a number of 
reasons, the most apparent of which appears to be the role played by immigrants’ 
confidence in civil rights protection afforded to them by state institutions.  Through 
experiences of discrimination with authority figures they associate with the state, and 
therefore the host nation, the confidence upon which a belief in future social and 
economic opportunities rests may become underimined. 
The ’Individuals Versus Institutions’ Dichotomy 
The ‘individuals versus institutions’ dichotomy emerged in relation to 
experiences of discrimination in Mosques and among other Muslims, but can also be 
applied to a variety of other non-Muslim contexts.  Here the actions of an individual 
stand in stark contrast to the actions of an institution, both in moral and civil terms.  Of 
the two research participants who described themselves as practicing Shia Muslims, 
both recounted adverse experiences praying among other Sunni Muslims.  The first, Ali, 
recounted the following: “I’ve prayed at Portland Community College where another 
Muslim came and, you know I’m a Shia, a Sunni person came next to me, sat next to me 
right after my prayer and told me ‘brother I just wanted to let you know that you prayed 
wrong’ and I was like ‘I didn’t know there was a wrong way to pray’ you know?” Here, 
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Ali responded to the opinion of another individual with his own, and wove the incident 
into his explanation of how he thought about Islam as “giving the same messages, it’s 
just in a different language.”  
Hassan, by contrast, recounted the following: “I was, uh, not allowed to pray in a 
Mosque… And not just because it was that Mosque’s fault, it’s just because what was 
traditionally taught to one of those brothers at the Mosque was thinking that my prayer 
would have ruined his prayer.” Here we see that what was ‘traditionally taught’ to a 
single person was enough to prohibit Hassan’s prayers from the Mosque as a whole. 
Consequently, Hassan observes that “culture does subtract usually from the purity of 
religion…” Of critical importance appears to be the role of institutions as actors in 
processes of inclusion and exclusion – between both Muslims and non-Muslims in the 
public sphere. The assignment of culpability, moreover, appears to occur strictly in 
relation to the public sphere.   
Thus, the role of individuals and institutions within public and private spheres 
can be hypothesized to determine the relative impact and perceived consequentiality of 
discrimination for research participants, with public institutions being the most harmful 
and private citizens the least.  The impacts of perceived discrimination from political 
candidates and community organizations appear to exist in the middle of a larger 
continuum defined by these poles.  In the 2016 U.S. Presidential campaign, for example, 
we have seen the Republican nominee for president discuss a possible moratorium on 
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immigration from Muslim-majority nations, as well as organizational support for such 
measures from immigration reform groups and ‘watchdog’ organizations.  While they 
are seeking public office and operating openly in the public sphere, respectively, 
political candidates and community organizations do not yet occupy state institutions 
and remain open to criticism in the context of democratic elections.  Coalitions can be 
built against them and solidarities formed.  Once occupying position of authority within 
state institutions, however, this analysis suggests the consequentiality of their actions 
may be of a singular magnitude, indicated in the following table. 
Relative Effects of Discrimination: 
Table 2. 
The Indirect Effect of Gender: Family Structure and Religious Visibility 
Family structure and the public visibility of religious dress emerged as factors 
that consistently determined significant differences between research participants.  
Individuals Institutions
Public Sphere Political Candidates The State
Private Sphere Private Citizens Community Organizations
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Both are fundamentally related to gender.  Thus, gender is seen to be manifested as an 
factor of influence indirectly through them.   
Marjan wore a headscarf to her interview and indicated she wears it regularly.  
“Since I’m covered, and walking around at night, I’m definitely more aware.  I feel like I 
have to be on watch all the time if I’m alone… People tell me to go back to my country 
all the time, and tell me that I can take my scarf off.” This observance is connected with 
her family structure, which is all-Muslim.  “I grew up in a very strict household, so 
religion and culture came before anything else. Family always comes first, so I still 
definitely hold onto a lot of that. It’s definitely affected me into adulthood, following the 
religion and the way we do things.” 
Ali, by contrast, is not visible the way Marjan is – subject to the requirements of 
a religious dress code.  He is able to otherwise ‘blend in’ in this regard. His family 
structure is also not all-Muslim. “My wife is American and my wife’s family are very 
conservative Catholics and hardcore Republicans. So I totally see the other side and we 
have our own conflicts on drinking alcohol, eating pork, who we’re gonna vote for, and 
um… but again at the end of the day they’re great human beings.  And, you know, they 
had me cornered as a Muslim for the longest time. Finally, they’ve got to know me so I 
think I’ve broken that barrier too.” 
Because bright boundaries rely on the successful identification of an 
individual as a Muslim, the consequences of religious dress can be seen to apply 
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differently between men and women.  While there are both male and female forms of 
Islamic religious dress, the normative requirement of religious dress is more often seen 
as compulsory, and applies disproportionately to women in the context of 
contemporary immigration to the U.S. In this way, the relative visibility of Muslim 
women effectively determines their relative vulnerability to the vicissitudes of bright 
boundaries, compared to Muslim men.   
The experiences of Marjan and Ali show them to be respectively more and less 
vulnerable in the public sphere in real terms – as visible subjects to be noticed in, and 
accordingly subjected to, Islamophobic post-9/11 contexts of reception.  Because 
Islamic dress is often a matter of familial influence among Muslim immigrants in the 
U.S., familial composition (i.e. how mixed or culturally-diverse) can be seen to structure
and determine the extent and nature of contact with non-Muslims in the public sphere.  
This affects, in turn, their relative visibility as well as the way in which they interpret 
their interactions with others.  And while family structure and religious dress are 
certainly interrelated as distinct factors, they both fundamentally hinge upon and reflect 
the larger influence of gender.   
This appears to reflect the fundamental insights of recent research on the use of 
the hijab by second generation Muslim immigrant women in the U.S. to construct both 
individual identites and autonomous spaces within the public sphere (Ali, 2005; Williams 
& Vashti, 2007).  It also speaks to the manner in which the visibility of religious dress can 
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impact the nature of what Dubois’ referred to as ‘double consciousness’ among 
members of a cultural minority and which Anzaldua (1987) has extended to include the 
experience of immigrant women.  In this way, the use of the hijab and other forms of 
visible religious dress, far from being the figurative ‘shackles’ for Muslim women 
imagined by native non-Muslim interlocutors in the West, represent an expressive 
“patois, a forked tongue, a variation of two languages” that communicates for Muslim 
immigrant women “realities and values true to themselves” (Alzaldua, 1987:35).  
Anzaldua (1987) has observed the conspicuousness of these linguistic and expressive 
variations, as well as the historical challenges and consequences faced by the immigrant 
women who bear them.   
The Direct Effect of Gender: Identifying with the Mainstream 
Nearly every research participant, all but two (who still expressed positive views 
of their life chances), responded affirmatively to the following question: “Looking at 
yourself, how do you personally see yourself within American society? Do you see 
yourself as ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of it? Are you a ‘member’?  How do you believe 
American society sees you personally?” (Question 9, Appendix A)  
Research participants were all quick, and to the point: 
“I see myself as inside” - Sholeh. 
“I do see myself as an American” - Farah. 
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“I believe I see myself as a member” – Marjan. 
“I feel like I’m a member and I’m a part of them” Maryam. 
“I see myself as a member…” Shahin. 
“I consider myself a member of the United States” Nemah. 
“I see myself as ‘in’. I’m an Oregonian” Ali. 
“I do include myself in the society, I do think I am an American” Jafar. 
Here we see a clear and unequivocal view emerge among research participants 
of themselves as ‘inside’ U.S. society.  They appear to meaningfully identify as members, 
even within post-9/11 contexts of reception defined by Islamophobia – which they also 
clearly recognize.  They see themselves as ‘in’, but the manner in which they do so 
differs sharply according to gender.   
Two worlds, One World, & In-Between 
While most respondents viewed themselves as members, identifying ‘inside’ the 
U.S. mainstream, male participants who elaborated on their answer above indicated a 
feeling of ‘inclusion amidst difference’.  They described themselves as not only living in 
‘one world’ but also as actively and constantly engaged in the task of breaking down 
barriers ‘between worlds’.  “If I walk into a room and somebody looks at me with my 
beard, immediately they might think, ‘oh this Muslim guy I don’t know where he’s from’. 
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But the moment I communicate with them their whole idea of who I was when I walked 
in the door changes. So I consider myself ‘in’” (Ali).   
Similarly, Shahin expresses a view where he is crossing the distance between 
himself and others: “when I speak with, you know, with other Americans… it’s kind of 
funny because they can sense my accent… and so that’s always a topic of curiosity.  And 
so that’s, I think, they will always know I’m not from here, but I do think they accept me 
as being a part of this country.” His inclusion appears to be supraordinate here.  That is, 
it appears to be regarded categorically above, or prior to, any other confounding or 
complicating factors such as Islamophobia or even subtle recognitions of his foreign 
accent.  For research participants, their sense of membership of was often expressed in 
interviews as a given, something they simply assumed before encountering or 
considering the realities of the social field itself. 
Female research participants, however, were split according to whether they 
wore a headscarf or not.  The two (of four) who did, Farah and Marjan, gave responses 
that were somewhat conflicted compared to their fellow research participants – both 
male and female. Farah, for example, put her role as an ‘active member’ of her family at 
issue: “I think that part of American society is that to be a true member of it, is that you 
really have to have a tolerance for all kinds of people and all types of mentalities. But if 
you’re such, if you’re so into a specific group… then it’s hard to accept those people as 
people but more as outsiders. So I do see myself as part of American society, but more 
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internally than what I externally portray.” In other words, because she actively performs 
and reproduces Yemeni culture within her own family, it is natural for Farah to see 
others who perform similar roles in different groups as outsiders. In this way, 
perceptions of ethnic ‘otherness’ between immigrant groups can be manifested among 
immigrants themselves in the U.S. It is also important to note that she says she sees 
herself as part of American society ‘more internally than externally’. This indicates her 
performance and reproduction of Yemeni culture and family norms could be more 
predominantly externalized, and performative, while her sense of membership in the 
mainstream is comparatively internalized, and not necessarily performed or reproduce 
in the same terms.  
These observations connect importantly with another significant finding of this 
study: when asked: “Do you live ‘in two worlds’ or one, or more than two?” (Question 
11, Appendix A), every female research participant responded that they lived ‘in two 
worlds’ or ‘more than two’ while every male research participant asked responded that 
they lived in ‘one world’. Where male respondents spoke of breaking down divisions 
and barriers within ‘one world’, female respondents gave the following responses: 
“I would say two. I mean, I think most Arabs would describe it as two… I know 
American culture doesn’t really regard elders and previous generations with high 
regards, but I mean, with Arabs and with Muslims its everything” - Sholeh. 
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“Probably more than two… one world when I’m with my family and when I go to 
the Mosque, and close family friends. And then a different one when I’m at work 
or school” - Marjan. 
“I live in seventeen… It’s hard… you feel yourself just kind of bled in the middle 
where you don’t’ know which way is better. You know what I mean?  So I find 
myself in my own world, really.  Like there’s thing I will never tolerate from my 
family and there’s thing I will absolutely never tolerate from my American 
friends” - Farah. 
One can exist at any given time within one world or the other, as with Sholeh 
and Marjan. But one can also exist between worlds, as evidenced by Farah’s account of 
her ‘own world’ amid the ‘seventeen’ she navigates as an active member of her family, 
as well as the broader society she lives and meaningfully participates in. Here, gender 
can be identified as a significant factor influencing how research participants experience 
and react to post-9/11 contexts of reception and how they corrected or redraw bright 
boundaries in response to them. With such a small sample, however, the results of this 
exploratory research can only suggest gender as a relevant frame of analysis for 
research on the children of Muslim immigrants, and furthermore, that it may remain a 
salient division within processes of selective acculturation.  Thus, selective acculturation 
processes are further emphasized as fertile grounds for future research, with an 
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additional focus on the indirect effects of gender through family structure and the 
visibility of religious dress.   
Finding #2: Evidence of Assimilation? Resilience within Post-9/11 Contexts of Reception 
Despite the effects of post-9/11 contexts of reception, research participants 
continued to express a positive view of their life chances and future opportunities in the 
U.S.  When asked: “For you, what does it mean to be successful in America?  Do you 
believe it possible for Muslims to succeed in America? Do they have the same chances 
for success as everyone else or not?  Why?” (Question 8, Appendix A) every respondent 
indicated an unequivocal belief in the possibility of success as they understood it and, at 
a minimum, an equality of life chances and opportunities for Muslims in the U.S.   Two 
examples of more simple, clear-cut responses were: 
“Yeah, definitely. To be successful in America, it’s the land of opportunity. 
Education and having a family, like, really Muslims can do that same thing.” - 
Maryam  
“Absolutely, I do feel everybody has the same chance. I don’t think religion 
hinders one from achieving what they want to achieve.” – Jafar  
Others wrestled more explicitly with issues of discrimination in ultimately reaching the 
same conclusion: 
90 
“Whereas Muslims, I feel like they do have the right and the ability to be 
successful in America. Obviously… people are looking at Muslims in a different 
way, and that shouldn’t be the case. But they’re in America, they have to take 
advantage of what they have and do things that is right, and not be looked down 
upon because of their actions, just because of stereotypes…  
Researcher: “So you don’t see stereotypes as a barrier that affect life chances?” 
“No, it should not. Definitely should not. In America you have the opportunity to 
do whatever you want to do and you should definitely take advantage of it.” – 
Nemah 
Another respondent expressed the sentiment in a similar manner. 
“If my goal, for example, is to be CEO of a company and I’m starting from the 
bottom, of course it’s going to be difficult… because for one thing I’m female, I’m 
a minority, I’m Muslim, so I got the three threats know what I mean? So of 
course it’s gonna be a hindrance. 
Researcher: “Is it possible?” 
“It is possible, but it’s not gonna be easy… Of course it’s possible. If you really put 
your mind to it, you’re gonna work your ass off until you get there.” – Farah 
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Research participants clearly recognize the prevalence of stereotypes and the 
many possible intersections between post-9/11 contexts of reception and more 
traditional forms of discrimination rooted in the historical legacy and contemporary 
reality of U.S. society.  At the same time, their perception of available opportunities and 
life chances does not appear to be determined by them.  For whatever reason, in the 
presence or absence of discrimination, second-generation Muslim immigrants in this 
study consistently and reliably held to the idea that life was ‘up to them’ – that they 
would determine the future as architects of their own destiny.   
Taken together, the positive view of one’s life chance and the perception of 
support amid discrimination appear to result in an impression among research 
participants that they belong to an upwardly assimilating minority group that is 
outperforming many of their peers - both native and immigrant.  Research participants 
spoke clearly to this view: “Muslims are in every field. They’re doctors, lawyers, they’re 
pretty successful in general as long as they work towards it” (Marjan).  While Ali 
observes that “the culture is open here… should be a good rate of success for 
Muslims…” he adds that, relative to other groups, “their success rate should be up…” 
Hassan reframes Ali’s observation in plainer terms: “They [Muslims] have an 
advantage… In the United States, nobody wants to offend another person. So if a 
Muslim wasn’t seen for a promotion, he’s now seen for a promotion. And even though 
he may have a higher skillset than the other person, it’s helping out a lot.” In this way, 
research participants can be seen to reasonably predict a parity of life chances relative 
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to other native-born groups, thus conforming to Alba & Nee’s (2003) criteria for 
assimilation into the American mainstream.   
Finding #3: Shifting the Bright Boundary 
Research participants’ reactions to post-9/11 contexts of reception took two 
successive forms: affirmations of a bright boundary within post-9/11 contexts of 
reception, then identification with the American mainstream.  This reaction constitutes 
a boundary shift, I argue, because there is a meaningful difference between how 
research participants understand their location within the U.S. mainstream and the way 
they have been consistently portrayed within post-9/11 contexts of reception.  In 
recounting their experiences of discrimination, research participants indicated a clear 
awareness of their perceived location outside the mainstream within negative post-9/11 
contexts of reception – on the ‘other side’ of the bright boundary, so to speak.  By both 
affirming the bright boundary and including themselves as members of the American 
mainstream, they effectively shift their location to the other side.   
Where Alba (2005) observes boundary shifting to be comparatively rare, and 
much less likely in general, the argument can also be made that research participants 
are correcting what they perceive to be an error in the way the bright boundary has 
been previously drawn within post-9/11 contexts of reception.  Either way, whether the 
boundary is being shifted or corrected, it is effectively re-drawn by research participants 
who assert themselves as a meaningful part of the American mainstream.  What then 
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remains is a blurred boundary between themselves and the mainstream to which they 
and their families belong. This dynamic is also put forward as another opportunity for 
future research, and presently hypothesized to subsequently bear upon processes of 
selective acculturation within blurred boundaries among second generation Muslim 
immigrants in the U.S.   
Affirming the Bright Boundary & Identifying with the Mainstream 
In affirming a bright boundary, research participants primarily focused on a 
rejection of takfir, or the pronouncement of other Muslims as ‘non-Muslims’.  Jafar’s 
explanation represents the clearest account of what nearly every research participant 
generally agreed on: ”as long as you do say the Shahada you are a Muslim… If somebody 
says they’re Muslim, they identify as Muslim, then they are Muslim.” In stronger, and 
somewhat paradoxical terms, Hasan argues that “the people, declaring themselves, 
saying that one Muslim is not a Muslim, those are true non-Muslims.” 
Thus, the research participants repeatedly consider the perpetrators of terrorist 
acts to be Muslims.  For them, the problem does not appear to be that terrorist acts are 
referred to as ‘Islamic terrorism’ in the U.S. media, but instead, that disproportionate 
visibility results in “Islamophobia, which I understand, but it’s really problematic 
because people know that, well, they just accept what they hear and there’s just no 
need or want to understand the facts for what they are” (Farah).  Consider the following 
comment by Nemah: 
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“From the recent actions of the last couple years, 9/11 terrorist attacks, ISIS 
whatever… it definitely has affected the way that white people, black people, 
Americans look at Muslims, [and] people from the Middle East. They just put a 
bad rap on the majority if not everyone that is Muslim. 
Researcher: “Do you think that is justified?” 
“I would say to an extent it is justified because of the actions [of] some 
Muslims... But that does not mean that every Muslim should be looked at that 
way… This is the generation we live in, and I don’t think it’s very pleasant. I don’t 
think it should be this way, but it is what it is.” 
These accounts paint a clear picture where research participants see two serious 
problems to consider, not one as is often implied within post-9/11 contexts of 
reception. The first is the problem of Islamic terrorism, the second is the problem of its 
inevitable conflation within the U.S. media. Americans are “getting a narrow view of 
Muslims and the culture… all they see is what the media is showing, so that is the only 
picture they get. Many Americans have never met a Muslim, so they don’t have 
anything else to go by” (Marjan).  This is where an Orientalized ‘Islam’ (Kumar, 2010) 
appears to have its roots within post-9/11 contexts of reception - not in labeling some 
acts of terrorism as ‘Islamic’, but in remaining critically unable to distinguish – in 
properly evaluative and proportional terms, between violent Islamic extremism and the 
rest of Islam, which happens to include the vast majority of Muslims in the West and 
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throughout the world. This ‘new Orientalism’ appears to be what members of the 
second generation take issue with and respond to in political terms. It appears to be 
what they want to talk to non-Muslims about and educate them on while 
simultaneously placing themselves across the divide from terrorists and on the side of 
the host nation to which they understand themselves to belong.   
Summary 
This section has presented exploratory findings that identify public institutions 
and gender as particularly fertile grounds for future research on experiences of 
discrimination among second generation Muslim immigrants within post-9/11 contexts 
of reception. It suggests support for Alba & Nee’s (2003) emphasis on the important role 
public institutions play as fundamental enablers for the belief among immigrants in a 
parity of life chances relative to their native peers through the protection of civil rights 
in the public sphere.  This section has also highlighted gender as an influential factor 
that should guide future research on the Muslim second generation in the U.S. In 
particular, the indirect effect of gender through family structure and the visibility of 
religious dress already has strong parallels in the U.S. immigration research literature 
from which to draw (Ali, 2005; Williams & Vashti, 2007) and incorporate into future 
analyses focusing more squarely on second generation Muslim immigrants.  The 
particularities of an immigrant double consciousness, moreover, have become 
established in research on Latina women immigrants in the U.S. (Anzaldua, 1987) and 
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remain so far unexplored in specific relation to second generation Muslim immigrants 
within post-9/11 contexts of reception. 
Finally, the findings here indicate resilience among research participants within 
post-9/11 contexts of reception that conform to Alba & Nee’s (2003) definition of ‘new 
assimilation’.  Furthermore, in actively affirming the bright boundary between Islamic 
extremists and the American mainstream while at the same time identifying as 
members of the American mainstream, research participants effectively shifted the 
bright boundary to alter their location with respect to it.  This touches on the role public 
institutions play as enablers of such processes, but more importantly to the point at 
hand: the phenomenon of boundary shifting observed among the small sample of 
research participants in this exploratory study constitutes promising grounds for future 
research on second generation Muslim immigrants in the U.S. – especially in relation to 
their comparatively favorable socioeconomic status relative to other immigrant groups. 
This further engages with the work of Portes & Rumbaut (2006) and other immigrations 
scholars concerned with trajectories of segmented assimilation.   
Section 2: 
Research Question #2: How do second-generation Muslim immigrants in the U.S. 
construct and maintain religious meaning? 
Finding #4: Constructing Islam: The Role of Family & Society 
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Research participants expressed unilaterally localized constructions of Islam.  In 
their accounts, two external factors emerged as ‘pressure points’ exerting power and 
influence on individuals in both how they construct and how they maintain religious 
meaning; first, through family – representing an ‘inner world’ and second, through the 
context of reception – representing an ‘outer world’ or broader society in the context of 
reception. From each of these locations the construction or maintenance of religious 
belief was seen to take on a particular significance. In their ‘inner world’ of family, for 
example, research participants appeared to be primarily concerned with the 
construction of religious meaning. In their ‘outer world’ defined by post-9/11 contexts of 
reception, however, the maintenance of religious belief was seen as the main 
imperative.   
Research participants dealt with each external factor (the family, and the context 
of reception) in two basic ways: by either accepting or rejecting their influence.  In order 
to avoid conceptual ambiguity and confusion surrounding categorical ‘acceptance’ or 
‘rejection’ of external factors, this study viewed any incorporation of the parents’ or 
families’ terms of interaction as a form of acceptance.  Clear statements such as: “my 
parents were raised very religiously, but they never passed on that desire or their beliefs 
on to me” (Shahin), “Religious wise, I mean, my parents aren’t really that religious” 
(Maryam), or “Not really. I mean, mine is so far from it. My version of religion anyway” 
(Sholeh) were required to classify a research participant as ‘rejecting’ familial influence 
– either because they actively rejected it or it was absent in terms they would describe
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as meaningful. This reflects the findings of existing research on the dynamics of selective 
acculturation within immigrant families and among the second generation in particular 
(Foner, 1997; Alba & Nee, 2003; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). 
Family & the Construction of Religious Meaning 
According to the research interviews, the power and influence of family factors 
served to localize Islam in a distinct way.  Acceptance of familial power or influence is 
therefore referred to as traditionalization, meaning that the second generation is 
carrying on the traditions of their parents. A rejection or absence of familial power and 
influence leads to its individualization, meaning research participants constructed an 
Islam that was individually distinct from that of their family or parents. As emphasized 
above, some familial influences were observed to emphasize individualism in Islam – 
these accounts are still regarded as ‘traditionalized’.  Only those research participants 
who constructed religious meaning in a manner consistent with a rejection or absence 
of familial influence were regarded as ‘individualized’.  
Rather interestingly, those who had constructed religious meaning in an 
individualized manner were seen to be concerned with Islam as a matter of doxa,
whereas those who had constructed religious meaning in a traditionalized manner were 
concerned with Islam as a matter of praxis. That is to say, because Islam is an 
orthopraxic religion the traditional emphasis is on praxis over doxa. Where differences 
in belief have been a source of scholarly and juridical debate, differences in practice 
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have been a source of outright conflict, defining not only a level of civil strife which 
became normalized in historical terms but also the root sectarian divisions that continue 
to define the Islamic world today (Lewis, 1993; Roy, 2004).  Those of the second-
generation who individualize the construction of religious meaning can be seen to so in 
an orthodox manner, emphasizing the value and meaning of belief itself – irrespective of 
practice.  This reflects the potential influence of the historically dominant (and also 
orthodox) religion in the U.S., Christianity, insofar as the preexisting practice of religion 
within host nations have been seen to prefigure the religious practices of immigrants. 
Contexts of Reception & the Maintenance of Religious Meaning 
The power and influence of contemporary discourses on Islam in the U.S. are 
exerted primarily through post-9/11 contexts of reception, and can also be seen to 
effectively structure the way members of the second generation maintain religious 
belief within the public sphere. Here, Portes & Rumbaut’s (2006) account of linear and 
reactive identity becomes especially useful as a frame of analysis.  Consistent with the 
research literature, interview participants were observed to maintain religious belief in 
reaction to prevailing discourses on Islam within the context of reception, i.e. the U.S.  
Hence, their maintenance of religious belief can be said to occur in a reactive manner.
That is, they engage with what they hear from non-Muslims in the public sphere in the 
way they maintain religious meaning.  
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Those who reject, or remain otherwise ambivalent toward, the external power 
and influence of prevailing discourses on Islam within post-9/11 contexts of reception 
can be seen to maintain religious belief in a linear manner – more preoccupied with 
’doing’ Islam (whatever that may mean for them) rather than’ talking about it’.  Where 
reactive maintenance appears to be dynamic and interactive, linear maintenance 
appears to be relatively static and interactively passive – at least where post-9/11 
contexts of reception are concerned.  I offer the following hypothetical empirical model 
as a hypothesis for the construction and maintenance of religious identity within the 
‘inner world’ of family and the ‘outer world’ of the context of reception: 
Family, U.S. Society & The Construction of Islam: 
Linear Reactive 
Individualized Linear Individualized Islam (LI) (2 
Participants)
Reactive Individualized Islam (RI) 
(2 Participants)
Traditionalized Linear Traditionalized Islam (LT) 
(3 Participants)
Reactive Traditionalized Islam 
(RT) (3 Participants)
Table 3. 
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Constructions of Islam: Four Vignettes 
In sum, these findings offer two distinct hypotheses for future research: first, 
that the family and the context of reception act as two sites where the construction and 
maintenance of meaning respectively occur within processes of selective acculturation 
defined by blurred boundaries; and second, that the construction and maintenance of 
religious meaning is dichotomized at each site such that four rudimentary types can be 
identified, potentially signaling the unique manner in which Islamic religious markers are 
being re-embedded within contemporary post-9/11 cultural contexts.  Rather 
interestingly, the pool of 10 research participants itself spread as evenly as possible into 
the four categories – 2 LI, 3 LT, 2 RI, and 3 RT.  What follows are a series of vignettes 
accounting for and describing each variation in the hypothesized typology.   
Linear Individualized Islam
Two respondents, Nemah and Sholeh, fit this categorization.  Consistent with the 
criteria above, the influence of family is expressly absent in how religious meaning is 
constructed and understood for both research participants. In response to the question: 
“In what ways are your parents’ religious lives connected with yours?” (Question 13, 
Appendix A) Sholeh replied that: “They raised us religiously, and I think… they’d be very 
disappointed.”  In response to Question 14 (Appendix A): “Do you feel a connection 
between your religious life and the histories and traditions of your people?”, She 
continued: “Not really. I mean, mine is so far from it. My version of religion anyway.”  
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Instead of signaling a break with the first generation, Nemah discusses the 
explicit absence of religious direction or influence from his family concerning Islam: 
“Religious wise, I mean, my parents aren’t really that religious.  My mom prays, and of 
course they have that background, but they don’t really implement it into our minds 
that we should be religious or think this way.” His response to Question 14 (Appendix A) 
is less elaborate and more straightforward: “I mean no, not really.” Both research 
participants describe a clear break with the preceding generation on the question of 
what Islam is, and what it means.   
On the question of religious identity in the public sphere, Nemah was also quite 
clear: “People who were born in the Middle East are born Muslim, but people who are, 
… like my nephew who was just born... is going to be considered Muslim, even though 
he has a different mindset considering he was born in the United States.” According to 
these sentiments, the act of being ‘born Muslim’ is as unavoidable as being born in the 
United States, or anywhere else for that matter.  In this way, Islam is something 
someone inherits and defines individually. In this sense it is not ‘practiced’ but ‘carried’ 
with oneself – alongside many other taken-for-granted attributes that may come to 
constitute part of one’s identity, but with which one may remain ultimately 
unconcerned with or ambivalent toward. 
Reactive Individualized Islam 
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Similar to the category above, several respondents fit this categorization.  The 
accounts of separation from familial influence in their constructions of religious 
meaning also bear striking similarity to the respondents who understood and practiced 
a Linear Individualized Islam. Shahin for example, stated that: “My parents were raised 
very religiously, but they never passed on that desire or that, their beliefs, on to me.  
They wanted to let me discover things by myself.” He also adds that, while he considers 
himself a Muslim, he “was born into it but… not, you know, practicing.” Ali strikes a 
similar vein: “My parents’ religious lives, my dad, he’s very, um, can’t say he’s religious. 
He’s more spiritual… he’s a Muslim but he doesn’t, he’s not loud about it or try to 
preach.” Both respondents indicate positive relationships with family, but also a clear 
break on the question of Islam, in terms of both doxa and praxis.  Consequently, both 
are here classified as constructing an individualized Islam.   
The maintenance of religious meaning for Shahin and Ali diverges sharply from 
the linear accounts of Nemah and Sholeh above.  Even though all four research 
participants construct religious meaning in an individualized manner, they maintain it in 
fundamentally different ways.  Shahin and Ali demonstrate a clear awareness of post-
9/11 contexts of reception as well as a willingness to engage with them on behalf of 
Islam, and as Muslims. Consider the following account from Shahin: 
“I think that sometimes you have people who could take some words and twist 
them around in a negative way.   
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Researcher: “In what way? What’s a ‘negative way’? 
“Unless you specifically specify what you mean I think there should be kind of an 
interpreter of what’s the Imam or what the person means… I think over the 
years, a lot of it has changed – the perception, especially after 9/11.  I would say 
that a lot of people are confused and don’t really know much. And I think that, I 
spend a lot of time telling people that I just meet, I tell them about Islam 
because they wouldn’t think that I’m Muslim in the first place.” 
On this point, Shahin is not only aware about negative stereotypes and continual 
distortions concerning Islam in the U.S., but also sees himself as an active interlocutor 
on its behalf.  In a general sense, he wants an ‘interpreter’ to clear up confusions about 
the religion and the way Muslims are perceived in the U.S.  At the same time, however, 
he is willing to play that role himself. This is one of the clearest examples of reactive 
maintenance of religious meaning in the public sphere.  What one believes is not simply 
‘carried’ with them in the public sphere, but actively ‘at issue’ – calling upon individuals 
to invest in the outcome of its public understanding and, consequently, in its social and 
political significance.  Reactive maintenance is of added significance for Shahin, whom 
people ‘wouldn’t think was Muslim in the first place’ – because he is a light-skinned, 
blue-eyed Eastern European. He is ‘invisible’ in an important sense, but instead makes 
himself visible in order to participate in what he sees as a necessary and important 
public dialogue.   
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While Ali speaks to being more ‘visibly Muslim’, he is no less committed to a 
reactive approach toward the maintenance of religious meaning.  “If I walk into a room 
and somebody looks at me with my beard, immediately they might think ‘oh, this 
Muslim guy, I don’t know where he’s from’. But the moment I communicate with them 
and interact with them their whole idea of who I was when I walked in the door 
changes” Ali also adds that he has “been invited to many churches to talk about Islam, 
or you know, perform a prayer.”  
These accounts suggest that while Shahin and Ali have constructed Islam in an 
individualized manner, they maintain religious meaning in a reactive manner.  They are 
not only aware of post-9/11 contexts of reception, but maintain a positive outlook on 
U.S. society and regard themselves as active participants within its discourses on behalf 
of Islam.  Where Ali uses his apparent visibility as an opportunity to educate others on 
Islam by confronting their perceptions and stereotypes, Shahin makes himself visible in 
order to challenge predominant ideas and stereotypes about Islam in a novel way, as 
well as educate others who may not have known they were speaking or acting with a 
Muslim individual present. 
Linear Traditionalized Islam 
In contrast to those who individualize Islam, Maryam and Hassan provide detailed 
accounts of how familial power and influence can play a role in the construction of 
religious meaning.  Maryam linked the significance of religion to her culture: “Just cause, 
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Muslim, being Muslim, it kind of dictates how our country is run… And being that it is 
religious, they have to, Iranian people have to follow their customs.” Similarly, when 
asked “How do you see yourself as being connected to the past of your family?” 
(Question 12, Appendix A), Hassan responded: “My last name. Praying five times a day. 
The eating of halal meat, as well as communicating with my family back home… Islam 
brought our family together.” Regarding his parents’ religious lives being connected 
with his own, Hassan continued:  
“My parents are at that point in life where they want to practice, and they 
preach it.  I speak to my mother on the phone, she says ‘don’t forget your 
prayers’, even though I don’t pray, as much. Um, my father will only call me just 
to tell me a verse, how it could relate to my life.” 
With both Maryam and Hassan we see active engagement, either through 
culture or explicit religiosity, on behalf of the first generation directed toward the 
second.  Furthermore, such efforts appear to be reflected in their construction and 
understanding of Islam.  In this way, the construction of religious meaning can be seen 
to be traditionalized for both Maryam and Hassan. 
Both research participants were also clearly linear in their maintenance of 
religious meaning. “Islam basically, to me, is very general for me. More like, being 
faithful to god. I don’t really have much more to go into that… I’m not really religious so 
I don’t really have an opinion of it. I was born Muslim” (Maryam).  Consistent with her 
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family’s influence, Islam is something Maryam ‘does’ rather than ‘believes’.  The 
relevant observation here is not the form of her religiosity, but its consonance with how 
the connection to her family informs the construction of religious belief – and its 
attendant maintenance in the public sphere.  Hassan demonstrates more clearly how a 
culturally-rooted and at the same time individually-defined Islam is distinct from what 
has been here categorized as ‘Individualization’: 
“An Imam in a Mosque, when I was visiting Iran as a kid… he told me every 
Muslim is going to look up around the mountain and see what path is going to 
work best for him. And you always think that path works best for you.  And it 
isn’t until you get to the top of the mountain, that very peak, you see the 
thousand different paths that you could have gone up and could have helped 
you out.” 
Hassan’s account of Islam is both familially-informed, as well as decidedly 
individualistic in its construction.  For Hassan, Islam is individualistic, but not 
individualized because it is connected quite clearly and firmly to the past and to the 
teachings of his family.  It is linear in maintenance because it is something he quietly 
carries within himself through a sense of sacred familial obligation, instead of something 
that is ‘at issue’ amidst larger dialogue in the public sphere. 
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Reactive Traditionalized Islam 
Of all the research participants, the only two females to wear headscarves, both 
of whom were open and outspoken in their interviews, both fit into this last category.  
Marjan exhibits a traditionalized construction of religious meaning as well as reactive 
maintenance.  When asked: “In what ways are your parents’ religious lives connected 
with yours?” (Question 13, Appendix A) She responded clearly and unequivocally: “In 
every way! I grew up in a very strict household, so religion and culture come before 
anything else.  Family always comes first, so I still definitely hold onto a lot of that.  It’s 
definitely affected me into adulthood, following the religion and the way we do things.” 
And when discussing Islam, reactive maintenance became apparent: “A lot of times 
people in the West think that the way Arabs or people from different cultures do things 
is actually religious when it’s not Islam. It’s just their culture… A simple way I put it for 
people who don’t really understand religion a lot: Being an American, you live in this 
country and they have rules.  One of the rules is you can’t drink when you’re under 21, 
but how many people actually follow that rule?  Does that mean they’re not American?” 
The argumentative nature of how Marjan explains Islam to others indicates both an 
awareness of contemporary discourses surrounding Islam and her role as an agent on its 
behalf.  She both identifies a source of confusion and actively participates in its 
clarification. 
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Similarly, Farah expresses her view of religion as connected to her family: “Islam 
is more of a sense of community to me. It’s home, it’s my family [ in the literal sense- 
immediate and extended family], it’s what I’ve been raised with…” And her orientation 
toward the public sphere is stridently reactive: “I have problem with religion in general 
and the way Islam is perceived cause its perceived more as a cult than a religion…” 
Evident in Farah’s statements are a connection to family and a belief that public 
perceptions of Islam are both relevant and consequential.   
She continues: ”But another thing about Muslims is anyone who does something 
in the name of God or in the name of the Prophet, or in the name of Islam, period, and 
justifies it as, that’s a bad Muslim because they should know better, like anything 
negative.” Farah is not only connected to her family, albeit in a somewhat more 
contentious manner than others, but also actively aware of and responsive to prevailing 
discourses surrounding Islam in the public sphere.  Both research participants practicing 
a Reactive Traditionalized Islam are visible representatives of their ethnic communities, 
as well as accountable Muslim interlocutors in the public sphere. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This study has conducted an introductory exploration of a small sample of 
second-generation Muslim immigrants in Portland, Oregon and the critical intersection 
they occupy between public discourses concerning both Islamophobia and radicalization 
within post-9/11 contexts of reception.  It originally hypothesized that the sudden shift 
from neutral to comparatively negative contexts of reception brought on by 9/11, 
combined with the brightening of previously blurred boundaries for Muslims in the U.S., 
would lead to an increase in the frequency and severity of discrimination experienced 
by second-generation Muslim immigrants and ultimately result in the formation of 
reactive identities and the construction of a Globalized Islam.    
This research disconfirmed my initial hypotheses. First, the extremely negative 
general context of reception initiated by 9/11 did not radicalize any of these research 
participants. They did not engage in a strongly combative reactive identity in response 
to increased prejudice and discrimination, and none expressed any sympathy for radical 
Islamic extremists. Instead, their confidence in civil rights protections afforded to them 
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by public institutions allowed them to engage in boundary shifting, and the 
reestablishment of blurred boundaries within which selective acculturation processes 
can continue. 
 Some engaged in a different, and importantly innocuous, form of reactive 
identity formation in the maintenance of religious meaning. And it is significant to note 
here that the reactive maintenance of religious meaning was found to be relatively 
incongruous with prior definitions of reactive ethnicity formation (Portes & Rumbaut, 
2006). In prior research, reactive identity formation has been identified as a largely 
negative outcome in response to social and economic discrimination as well as family 
conflicts.  Its consequences have been significant for the structural integration of 
immigrant communities and the individual well-being of their children.  This may reflect 
a difference in the role of reactivity within processes of identity construction versus 
identity maintenance – where prior research may have captured reactivity in identity 
construction, whereas it has here been encountered in relation to identity maintenance.  
In any case, the role of reactivity observed among research participants in this study 
does not appear to conform to the more problematic manifestations of reactive identity 
formation documented among immigrants in the U.S. or in Europe.  In fact, it can be 
seen as relatively congruous with other forms of identity maintenance within a polarized 
American mainstream repeatedly conditioned and evolved within the perpetual 
historical shockwaves of immigration and larger global events. 
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Beyond this, the study identified a number of emergent differences in how 
participants both experienced and reacted to comparatively negative post-9/11 contexts 
of reception. First, they recognized that 9/11 transformed what had been in Alba’s 
(2005) terms a blurred boundary between Islamic immigrants and the U.S. society into a 
bright and often impermeable difference. These second-generation immigrants 
responded by moving the bright boundary and defining it not as one that distinguished 
all Islamic adherents from U.S. society, but instead only those who were Islamic militant 
extremists were on the other side of the bright boundary. Moderate Muslims, which 
included all the respondents in this study, felt that the boundary between them and U.S. 
society was still a blurred boundary, a boundary that would not impede their 
assimilation and success in U.S. society.  
By both identifying with the mainstream and affirming bright boundaries, 
research participants effectively shifted the boundary to alter their locations with 
respect to it.  In this context, they actively reestablished blurred boundaries between 
themselves and the cultural mainstream, thus enabling processes of selective 
acculturation to continue. By learning English and gaining advanced education, they 
became (or at least perceive that they become) a part of U.S. society at the same time 
that they maintained their belief in Islam and at least partial continuation of their 
parents’ homeland cultures. This process was facilitated, crucially, by the perceived 
character and role of public institutions operating on their behalf. 
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Despite their experiences of discrimination by individuals and private 
organizations, research participants expressed strong confidence in the protections 
afforded to them by state institutions against discrimination.  As a result, they were able 
to ‘reasonably predict a parity of life chances’ relative to their peers in the cultural 
mainstream.  These results suggest support for Alba & Nee’s (2003) definition of 
contemporary assimilation as well as its potential for use among Muslim immigrant 
populations as an analytical lens in future research.  
Beyond facilitating assimilation and enabling boundary shifting, the role of public 
institutions also emerged as a critical factor in shaping experiences of discrimination 
among the research participants.    Experiences of discrimination attributable to 
individuals or private organizations were often dismissed as ‘ignorant’, and research 
participants exhibited great resilience toward discrimination in this regard.   
Discrimination by public institutions, especially in the context of those occupying 
positions of power, were seen to be particularly consequential by all accounts.  These 
experiences appeared to deeply affect research participants on a personal level as well 
as potentially undermine their confidence in the protections afforded to them in the 
public sphere by the larger society. As a result, the role of public institutions was seen as 
the most important determinant of the relative harm caused by experiences of 
discrimination for research participants.   
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The second research question asked: How do second-generation Muslim 
immigrants construct and maintain religious meaning?  Here research participants were 
seen to unilaterally construct Islam in a localized manner, aligning with the research 
literature’s extensive accounting of how religious meaning is being constructed among 
the vast majority of second generation Muslims in the West.  The ‘inner world’ of family 
and the ‘outer world’ of the larger society - defined primarily by the context of 
reception, were seen as key sites where religious meaning was respectively constructed 
and maintained within selective acculturation processes enabled by (at least the 
perception of) blurred boundaries.  This suggests support for Portes & Rumbaut’s (2001) 
account of family and society as key influential factors for processes of selective 
acculturation within large coethnic communities absent intergenerational conflicts.   
The hypothetical typology of Islamic religious identity has also been put forward 
in this study. It is based on the dichotomization of the construction and maintenance of 
religious meaning at each site within the selective acculturation process.  In either 
accepting or rejecting familial influence, religious meaning is identified as being 
respectively ‘traditionalized’ or ‘individualized’ in its construction.  Similarly, in either 
accepting or rejecting the influence of public discourses on Islam within post-9/11 
context of reception, religious meaning is identified as being respectively ‘reactive’ or 
‘linear’ in its maintenance.  Thus, four hypothetical variants can be seen to emerge that 
potentially indicate the way in which Islamic religious markers are being re-embedded 
within post-9/11 contexts of reception and used to construct politically-salient religious 
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identities among the research participants.  This approach reflects, furthermore, Stepick 
& Stepick’s (2010) important call for future research on the children of immigrants to 
explore the “complex processes and trends rather than discrete social divisions” (14) 
such as their country of origin.  By focusing on the Muslim second generation in the U.S., 
this exploratory study has attempted to do just that. 
The limitations of these results have also been made quite clear in this study.  
With such a small sample size, no meaningful generalizations are possible.  What this 
study has achieved are only tentative, suggestive findings that offer important and 
focused hypotheses for future research. The sampling method undertaken here for 
exploratory purposes will be inadequate for the purposes of future research.  Future 
research methods must move beyond convenience sampling, include many more 
participants and ultimately reflect more accurately in their composition the population 
they seek to explore. In order to address the fertile grounds for future research that 
have been identified and test the hypotheses that were the aim of this exploratory 
study to produce, a larger sample population, truly random sampling and a diverse array 
of research methods must be employed. 
Summary of Contributions: 
Research Question #1: How have second generation Muslim immigrants in the U.S. 
experienced and reacted to post-9/11 contexts of reception?
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This research has identified two factors, public institutions and gender, as 
particularly fertile grounds for future research on experiences of discrimination within 
post-9/11 contexts of reception among second generation Muslim immigrants. It has 
also offered a hypothetical model that identifies the relative consequentiality of 
different actors as sources of discrimination – according to whether they are individuals 
or organizations that are public or private in nature. This finding suggests support for 
Alba & Nee’s (2003) emphasis on the importance of public institutions in the 
assimilation process.   
This research has also identified the successful assimilation of research 
participants into the U.S. mainstream in a manner consistent with Alba & Nee’s (2003) 
definition of: a reasonable belief in parity of life chances relative to their peers in the 
mainstream. It has highlighted their resilience within post-9/11 contexts of reception as 
fertile grounds for future research in this context, hypothesizing that in both affirming 
bright boundaries within post-9/11 contexts of reception and also actively identifying as 
members of the U.S. mainstream, research participants effectively shift their location 
with respect to the bright boundary and reestablish blurred boundaries. 
Research Question #2: How do second generation Muslim immigrants construct and 
maintain religious meaning? 
This research has emphasized the political-salience of Islamic religious identity 
within contemporary post-9/11 contexts of reception.  It has put forward the hypothesis 
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that the family and the context of reception act as two sites where the construction and 
maintenance of religious meaning occur, respectively, within processes of selective 
acculturation defined by blurred boundaries.  It has further hypothesized that the 
construction and maintenance of religious meaning are dichotomized at each site, and 
offered a hypothetical typology identifying four rudimentary forms of religious identity 
that may be emerging among second generation Muslim immigrants today.  
Directions for Future Research 
1) Exploring Post-9/11 Contexts of Reception
Extending the previous work of immigration scholars to specifically address the 
complexity of post-9/11 contexts of reception remains an unfinished analytical task 
future research should address.  Semi-structured in-depth interviews with members of 
the first generation should be conducted in order to incorporate their accounts and 
experiences of the shift between pre and post-9/11 environments.  The addition of data 
from the second generation in specific relation to post-9/11 contexts of reception, 
furthermore, would provide a more complete account among the population of Muslim 
immigrants as a whole, and importantly build upon and refine the accounts that have 
been presented in this exploratory study.  A fuller account of post-9/11 contexts of 
reception and their effects on Muslim immigrants in the U.S. may also enable a range of 
comparative analyses vis a vis the European research literature.    
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2) The Politics of Boundary Processes Among Muslim Immigrants in the Post-9/11
Era
Future research should explore the relationship between boundary processes 
and various forms of political identity in the context of the Muslim Second Generation.  
Specifically, the relationships between Localized Islam and Selective Acculturation, and 
between Globalized Islam and Boundary Crossing requires further exploration and 
clarification.  Particular attention should be paid to the role of historical consciousness 
and familial culture in the construction of various religious identities, as well as to 
transnational migration and the impact of social media in shifting the fundamental 
dynamics and key demographics of this terrain.   
Of particular interest should be the role of social media in complicating the 
geographical rootedness of bright and blurred boundaries, and the acculturation 
processes of immigrants in relation to them. For example: has the ‘convergence of 
space’ brought on by the proliferation of social media within the transnational 
immigrant class allowed blurred boundaries to be established and maintained between 
host nations and immigrants’ countries of origin? And what role does social media play 
in the formation and maintenance of bright boundaries among second generation 
immigrant populations within Western host nations? 
3) The Role of Gender
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Research exploring the influence of gender must work to meaningfully address 
second generation Muslim immigrants beyond the conventions of contemporary 
domestic discourses in the U.S.  Extending work on immigrants’ ‘two worlds’ and the 
idea of a double consciousness to new groups would certainly be a worthwhile scholarly 
endeavor.  Future research following this research may focus on qualitative accounts of 
double consciousness among Muslim immigrants and its  gendered impact on processes 
of selective acculturation, particularly in relation to the issues of religious dress and 
religious intermarriage.  
4) The Role of Public Institutions
Future research should also go beyond simply identifying the important role 
public institutions play in mediating experiences of discrimination and their 
consequences.  It is critical to also examine the myriad ways that trust is established in 
state institutions, the factors that incline or disincline them toward discrimination 
against Muslims, and the larger role they play in enabling contemporary processes of 
assimilation to occur among such an ethnically-diverse and geographically-diffuse 
population. 
5) Islamic Religious Identity in the U.S.
The final research direction identified by this pilot study concerns extending the 
hypothetical typology to explore its salience as a model and its potential generalizability. 
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In addition to exploring across disparate geographies at the national, regional, and local 
levels, future research should also consider how these factors vary in relation to family 
and society as external ‘pressure points’ respectively influencing the construction and 
maintenance of religious meaning within processes of selective acculturation.  Beyond 
the second generation, exploring how Islam is being redefined in the American context, 
as Judaism and Catholicism in the 20th century before it (Alba & Nee, 2003), remains a 
critically-important scholarly task and opportunity for future research farther down the 
road. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Questions: 
Constructions of Islam 
1) What is your definition of Islam?  What does it mean to you in your own words?
2) Are there major differences between you and other Muslims on the question of
what Islam means? Or would you say there are more similarities between you
than differences?  If so, what are they? What points of agreement/disagreement
can you highlight?
3) More broadly, who do you believe is or is not legitimately a Muslim? Where are
the boundaries, if any, in your opinion?
4) What about Muslims from different countries, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Iran,
Indonesia, or Saudi Arabia?  How do ethnic backgrounds and traditional cultures
shape Islam in these regions? What about your parent’s country of origin?
5) What do you believe should be the role of unique local traditions and cultures in
Islam? Do they add to or subtract from it?
The U.S. Mainstream 
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6) Does living in America help or hinder your ability to live as a Muslim and practice
Islam faithfully? Describe your personal experience and your perception of
Muslims in the U.S.
7) Do you see American society more as friendly or more as hostile toward Islam?
What about Muslims?
a. (If answer focuses on themselves) How would you characterize the
experiences of friendliness or hostility from other U.S. Muslims?
Examples?
8) For you, what does it mean to be successful in America? Do you believe it
possible for Muslims to succeed in America? Do they have the same chances for
success as everyone else or not?  Why?
9) Looking at yourself, how do you personally see yourself within American society?
Do you see yourself as ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of it?  Are you a ‘member’? How do
you believe American society sees you personally? (Probe for who the
respondent is thinking of when he/she responds, eg, employer, fellow workers
or students, neighbors, etc. Ask for examples.)
10) Are their tension points you see between yourself as a Muslim and as an
American?  What are they in your opinion? Do you feel them in your daily life?
Or are they more subtle and/or pervasive?
11) Do you ‘live in two worlds’ or one, or more than two? (Probe)
Family 
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12) How do you see yourself as being connected to the past of your family?
13) In what ways are your parents’ religious lives connected with yours?
14) Do you feel a connection between your religious life and the histories and
traditions of your people?
15) Are any of there points of contention between you and your family on issues
relating to Islam or American society?
16) How would you describe your relationship with your parents/family
(grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins etc…) more generally?
Friends
17) How many friends would you say you have?  How often do you see them?
18) Do you have friends from many different groups?  Only a few? Which groups?
19) What relationships are most important to you?
20) Some people don’t have many friends or associate with that many people, but
have a ton of friends online.  How active are you on social media?  How do you
spend most of your time online – studying, socializing etc…?
Demographic Controls
What is your age? 
What is your occupation/Income? 
What is your highest level of schooling? 
Are you married? 
What is your family’s country of origin? 
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Appendix B 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Shahriyar from Portland 
State University, Department of Sociology. The researcher hopes to learn about the 
factors that shape what Islam means in the U.S. today for the children of Muslim 
immigrants, their family dynamics, and their experiences interacting within the larger 
society. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you are 
between the ages of 18 and 35, and have at least one parent who is a first-generation 
Muslim immigrant. 
If you decide to participate, you will be included in a one-on-one interview involving a 
series of short questions that will be digitally recorded. While participating in this study 
it is possible that you may wish to stop, or continue at a later time.  Please feel free to 
exercise these options at any time you see fit. You may not receive any direct benefit 
from taking part in this study, but the study may help to increase knowledge which may 
help others in the future.  
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be linked to 
you or identify you will be kept confidential. This information will be kept confidential by 
the interviewer and the research team.  Interviews will be coded to preserve anonymity, 
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and transcribed onto a password-protected computer with an encrypted hard drive. 
Pseudonyms will also be used for publication to protect the identities of all research 
participants.  
Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study, and it will not 
affect your relationship with Portland State University. You may also withdraw from this 
study at any time without affecting your relationship with Portland State University. 
If you have questions or concerns about your participation in this study, contact 
Shahriyar Smith at 503-725-9025.   If you have concerns about your rights as a research 
subject, please contact the PSU Office of Research Integrity, 1600 SW 4th Ave., Market 
Center Building, Ste. 620, Portland, OR; phone (503) 725-2227 or 1 (877) 480-4400. 
Your signature indicates that you have read and understand the above information and 
agree to take part in this study. The researcher should provide you with a copy of this 
form for your own records. 
________________________________________________ Signature 
 ____________________________             Date 
_________________________________________________________ 
Print name 
